Governmental Responsibility in Tort, IV by Borchard, Edwin
YALE
LAW JOURNAL
Vol. XXXVI NOVEMBER, 1926 No. 1
GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY IN TORT, VI
EDWIN Al. BORCHARD
HISTORY AND THEORY
In the earlier articles of this series, an attempt was made to
present a general view of the Anglo-American law in so far as
it involves the right of the individual to obtain redress from the
group-nation or state, county or city or administrative district
-for injuries sustained by him through the defective operation
of the public service or through the torts of officers.2 While it
was hardly possible altogether to avoid the discussion of under-
lying theory, the intention was to reserve for separate articles
an examination of the several theories which have been ad-
vanced to deny or sustain the responsibility of the state or
government in tort. It is not believed to be desirable to confine
the discussion to theories evolved in England or the United
States, which on the whole rest upon an ancient doctrine that
consigns the issue to sterility. But the western world has much
the same economic and social system, and its political conceptions
have much in common. Profit can therefore be derived from
an examination of the theories advanced in other countries,
1 (1924) 34 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 1, 129, 229.
2 The special reason for beginning with a discussion of positive law
was to lay the foundation for federal legislation in the 69th Congreos,
commencing Dec. 7, 1925. Bills to make the federal government respons-
ible for the negligence or wrongful acts or omissions of its officers or em-
ployees were introduced in both Houses by the respective chairmen
of the Claims committees. The comprehensive House bill was passed June
10, 1926; a Senate bill, S. 1912, limited to a liability of 30O0, to bi re-
covered by a proceeding before the executive department responsible for
the injury, passed the Senate March 15, 1926. The bills are now (No-
vember, 1926) in conference. See Borchard, Govcmncntal Re.-poni&fiity
in Tort-A Proposed Statutory Reform (1925) 11 Am. B. A. J. 495, and
H. R. No. 667, 69th Cong. 1st Sess.
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where the subject has greatly occupied the public mind, for or
against the responsibility of the state or minor political group.
It was not until the nineteenth century that the subject seri-
ously engaged the attention of legislators, courts and jurists.
The demand for an assumption by the community of the losses
occasioned to individuals by a defective operation of the govern-
mental machine hardly arose before then, though the practice
was not unknown. The explanation for the demand probably
lies in the fact that the industrial revolution and the division
of land promoted an ever-widening distribution of private prop-
erty and recognition for the personal privileges of the individual,
to which the political theories of the American and the French
Revolution, spreading through the western world, had given
the protection of a social and political philosophy. The ab-
solutist theory of the irresponsible Prince had aroused the an-
tagonism of the publicists and philosophers of the eighteenth
century, who with the new orientations of natural law, had
sought to restore the medieval cultural tradition of the respons-
ible State and Government controlled by law. The "rights of
man" and of his private property against the encroachment, mis-
appropriation or abuse of government had become tenets of con-
stitutional law, first formally expressed in the doctrines of emi-
nent domain. The enlargement of state responsibility for other
forms of encroachment on private rights was nevertheless ham-
pered, in varying degree in different countries, by the seven-
teenth and early eighteenth century revival of the theory of di-
vine right of kings and by the metaphysical doctrine of sover-
eignty, the alleged postulates of irresponsibility. The struggle
between these opposing doctrines of individual claim to compen-
sation for injuries by the group and group claim of sovereign
immunity marks one of the most interesting developments in
legal history. The struggle was tempered, though never termin-
ated, by the introduction of the personal responsibility of offi-
cers, which, while theoretically sustainable, often affords only il-
lusory redress to the injured individual. His demand for protec-
tion against administrative abuses was also met by numerous
procedural devices, such an mandamus, certiorari and judicial
safeguards of various kinds designed to nullify the wrongful act
or correct the mistake without pecuniary compensation. Contin-
ental Europe had also been familiar since the tine of the Roman
Empire with the suability and responsibility of the State or
feudal and territorial ruler acting in a fiscal or corporate capac-
ity; and even in governmental functions, the insistent demand for
justice to the individual from the group, marked as it was by an
ever-widening range of activities by the group, finally succeeded,
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in overcom-
ing those legal and political arguments which had made for the
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irresponsible sovereign. The movement was equally successful in
republican France and monarchical Germany, and owes its tri-
umph to the enlightenment of judges and of jurists courageously
attacking and overthrowing antiquated shibboleths left in the
way of legislatures and of courts. Only in democratic England
and republican America do we find the absolutist metaphysics of
divine right and sovereign immunity arrayed in the full regalia
of their theological vestments, reincarnating for a twentieth
century society the ancient credo of Bodin and Hobbes.
Before undertaking to present the various theories which
have been advanced to support the divergent legal doctrines of
governmental irresponsibility or responsibility, it seems useful
to survey briefly the historical development of the theories of
vicarious responsibility in general, and notably of corporate and
community responsibility in tort. It will then be proper to enter
more closely upon an examination of those doctrines which
have served to exempt the State, in English and American law,
from responsibility in tort, notably the maxims that the king
can do no wrong and that the State is above the law. The latter
postulate invites an examination of the history of political and
legal theory as to the relation of the State to law in its various
connotations, and of that other confusing abstraction employed
to justify absolutism, known as sovereignty. Before the con-
stitutional state had achieved its victory over the unlimited mon-
archy by creating the independence of the judiciary from the ad-
ministration and judicial control over the governmental machine
in its relations with the individual, an intellectual contest of cen-
turies, paralleling the political, had been fought in Europe and
*America. All the more remarkable, then, is it that in England
and America, where the political struggle for emancipation was
so eminently successful, the legal struggle should have been
denied complete success by the interposition of ambiguous
maxims and historical anachronisms based on arbitrary postu-
lates and outworn conceptions.
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY IN TORT
Roman Law. The Roman law provided but imperfect pro-
totypes for the modern conceptions of the State, of sovereignty,
of officers exercising State power, or of private individuals pos-
sessing privileges and immunities which the State may not con-
stitutionally impair. Hence it is not difficult for those seek-
ing to justify the irresponsible State to find authority in the
Roman law. On the other hand, the Roman law embodying
the only well-developed legal system knowm in continental
Europe, it is natural that analogies should be sought in the
Roman private law for such degree of group responsibility in
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tort as jurists and courts were able to introduce. It was found,
even at a date when sufficient progress had been made to con-
cede the application of the agency analogy to the relation be-
tween government and officer, 3 that the Roman law admitted
only a limited liability of the principal for the acts of his agent.
In the conclusion of legal transactions the strict Roman law
did not admit the doctrine of representation, though exceptions
were recognized. A principal could become liable on a contract
concluded by his authorized agent providing the fact of the
agency were disclosed. In the strict Roman law only the con-
tracting party himself, the agent, could be sued; the praetor,
however, permitted an action in addition against the principal.
The principal's liability was theoretically vicarious for the act
of another; modern law reverses this theory and considers the
principal's liability primary and exclusive. Later, it is believed,
even the agent's ostensible authority bound the principal, in-
cluding liability for dolus (wilful wrong) or culpa (negligence)
of the agent in the conclusion or performance of a contract
within the scope of his ostensible authority.
4
On the other hand, tort liability was based on fault only, an
act of the will, and this could' not well be vicarious even as to
individual principals. Nevertheless, as in early English law, in
certain exceptional cases the employer was held liable under the
praetor's law for torts committed by servants within the scope
of their employment, e.g. shipowners (nautae), innkeepers
(caupones) .and stable-keepers (stabularii). The tort of a
slave made the master-liable to a noxal action.5
A principal could be made liable for his own negligence in
selecting or supervising a wrongdoing agent, culpa in eligendo
32 BRINZ, LEHRBUCH DER PANDEXTEN (Erlangen, 1860) 1118 makes as
distinction between higher officials and minor employees, asserting that only
the former are agents of the State, with power to represent it, whereas
the latter are agents of the officials without power of representation. Loen-
ing finds this unsustainable. LO.NING, DIE HAFTUNG DES STAATES AUS
RECHTSWIDRIGEN HANDLUNGEN SEINE BEAMTEN (Frankfurt, 1879) 11.
The Roman law did not concede that the officer was an agent or manager
(institor). In the late Empire, the imperial officials were deemed per-
sonal agents of the Emperor, and only subsequently deemed State officials.
1 AlITTEIs, RO6MISCHES PRIVATRECHT (Leipzig, 1908) 354 et seq.
4 2 WINDSCHEID, PANDEKTEN (Frankfurt, Kipp's 9th ed. 1906) § 482;
P. F. VON WYss, HAFTUNG FiR FREMDE CULPA NACH RO MISCHEN REOUT
(Zurich, 1867) 1, 6.
5 If the master did not pay, he could be compelled to surrender
the slave. A paterfamilias in early Roman law had.the same option with
respect to the torts of his children. SOHm, THE INSTITUTES (Ledlie's transl.
2d ed. 1901) 435-440; W. W. BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW
FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN (Cambridge, 1921) 516, 529 et seq. There
is some doubt whether communication of the agent's authority was indis-
pensable. See also Radin, Fundamental Concepts of the Roman Law
(1924) 13 CALIF. L. REV. 34, at 39.
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or custodiendo. If one was under a personal duty to perform
an obligation and selected a substitute, the principal assumed
responsibility for the substitute's negligence.0 Public policy
dictated the rule. The principal was also bound to return any-
thing obtained through the wrongful act of his agent as un-
just enrichment.
The corporation or juristic person, which in Roman law was
invented largely to accommodate the conception of the public
corporation, could only with difficulty be brought within the
compass of these limited rules of legal responsibility. There is
some authority for the view, strongly disputed, that the
populus Romanus, the nearest earlier Roman conception to the
State, could hardly be subject to the rules of private law, for
it would thus be bound by its own laws.7 But as the Emperor's
power increased and that of the popzlus diminished, the Imper-
ial treasury, the fiscus, was created, and the question lost im-
portance, for the fiscus, the State in its property relations, could
be sued.8 In the Corpus Jurs, the distinction between the
Emperor and the State, between the Emperor's property and
State property, is not very clear. Yet the State achieved a
gradual evolution; Caesar's officers became State officers, and the
ftscus acquired recognition as a legal entity for the ownership
of State property. Municipalities, though of many types
and having only a limited legal capacity, had to enter
into contracts, had to have agents and had to assume a
6
JHERING, DER SCHULztioiENT m RUiSISCHEN RECHT, reprinted in
VERMISCHTE SCHRIFTEN JURISTISCHEN INHALTS (Leipzig, 1879) 204, 207.
Equity justified these exceptions to the rule. Wyss, op. cit. supra note 4,
at 1. Loening also mentions certain other exceptional cases of liability for
the torts of third persons, the paterfamilias' responsibility for his family,
the master for his slave and the responsibility of certain special officers
such as tax-fermers for the acts of their subordinates and employees.
LOENING, op. cit. supra note 3, at 10. The last analogy was employed by
the jurists of the late Middle Ages to justify a community responsibility
for the acts of officers. Ibid.
71 AMO1MSEN, PAHFSCHES STAATSRECHT (Leipzig 1876) 162 and 227, and
as cited by LOENING, op. cit. supra note 3, at 12. Pernice thinks that offi-
cers could bind the State legally. 1 MAncus ANTISTIuS LABO, D,%S
RM5ssciSES PRIVATRECHT (Halle, 1873) 264 et scq. BmRz, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 1081, citing also Gppert, denies A ommsen's earlier view that
the State and community were not bound by any of the rules of private
law. See also LOENING, op. cit. supra note 3, at 12, who finds little evi-
dence to support Mommsen's view.
s 3 BETHuANN-HOLLWEG, DER MMuSCHE CIVULPROZESS (Bonn, 1866) 78;
Alrrris, op. cit. supra note 3, at 364; BUCxLAND, op. cit. supra note 5, at
177. On the Fiscus, see also 2 J. B. MiSPOULET, Lrs INsTrmruboNs PoT, -
TIQUES DES R 0IAINS (Paris, 1883) 286; F. GUGLIELI-O SAvAGNoNE, LE
TERRE DEL Fisco NELL0 ItFm Ro00ANo (Palermo, 1900) 3 et scq; Orrc
RICHTER, DER REICHSFISKUS (Tubingen, 1908) 3; HArsCHsi, DI RECKT-
LICHE STELLUNG DES Fiscus (Berlin, 1899) ; 1 OTTo MAxER, DEUTCMHER VER-
WALTUNGSRECHT (Miinchen, 3d ed. 1924) 49 et scq.
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certain responsibility for the latters' contractual acts-
usually concurrently with the agent. A corporation could
act only through representatives, who required a power of at-
torney delimiting their authority. These representatives were
either "organs" or managers, whose powers are found in the
law or the charter, or employees, who receive their powers
from the organs or managers. The organs are thus empowered
to grant substitute powers of attorney, and the latter will then,
curiously for that era, represent the principal, the corpora-
tion.10 The usual rule that representation by another in the
declaration of one's will was inadmissible had to be varied in
the case of corporations, for whom organs and employees ex-
erted their personal will. *Representation in the exercise of
rights was, however, always recognized. The corporation,
though deemed an artificial juristic person, independently of its
members, was nevertheless deemed incapable of will or legal
capacity; analogously to an infant or an incompetent person,
its managers or representatives might be compared with guar-
dians or trustees.
For wilful wrong or excess of authority by the agent he alone
was liable in Roman law, except to the extent of the corpora-
tion's unjust enrichment. The private principal's responsibil-
ity for the acts of contracting agents was thus greatly limited
in the case of public corporations. The powers of public offi-
cials rested as a rule not on contract but on law, and it was
concluded that wilful wrong or negligence was always a per-
sonal act of the will, which could not be attributed to a cor-
poration, more especially as corporate personality was deemed
essentially a fiction." In the case of official torts generally, it
9 The Roman law distinguished contracts concluded by direct representa-
tion which made the city immediately liable and entitled, and those which,
though concluded in the name of the city, could render the city liable only
through the person of its representative. LOENING, op. Cit. supra note 3,
at 13.
10 LOENING, op. cit. supra note 3, at 11. The Roman law theory of the
corporation is to be found in numerous works, notably 3 GmRK, DAS
DEUTSCHE GENOSSENSCHAFTSRECHT (Berlin, 1881) 34 et seq., 168-171;
MITTEIS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 394 et seq.; H. BOVAY, ETUDE SUR LA
RESPONSABILITfi CIVILE DES PERSONNES MORALES A RAISON DES AcTEs ILLI-
CITES DE LEURS ORGANES (Lausanne, 1911) 1.
1 The father of the fiction theory of the corporation, according to
Gierke, was Sinibald Fieschi, who in 1243 became Pope Innocent IV. Inno-
cent had declared the fictitious person incapable of sin or tort: Universi-
tas non potest peccare universitas non potest delinquere. This dictum was
probably founded on a passage in the Digest, Dig. 4, 3, 15, s. 1. 3 GmRKE,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 168, 279; also Maitland's translation of GIERKH,
POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MMDLE AGE (Cambridge, 1900) Introduction,
xix. See also H. A. SmITH, THE LAW OF ASSOCIATIONS (Oxford, 1914) 59,
152; C. T. CARR, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
(Cambridge, 1905) c. XI. Saviguy worked out the classic argument against
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was thus fairly easy to argue that inasmuch as responsibility
rested on fault, and inasmuch as fault required an act of the
will, of which corporations were incapable, torts made only
the wrongdoing officer personally liable and not corporations.2
While this rule was resented by many jurists as unjust, a pro-
test which later brought about a recognition of liability of su-
perior officers for the excesses of their subordinate appointees,
it is astonishing for how many centuries the theory of fault
resting on an alleged free will served to relieve corporations,
public and private, of responsibility in tort. It easily devel-
oped into the well-known vltra vires doctrine, according to
which the officer or agent was empowered to act only rightfully
within the scope of the corporation's powers. He had no legal
authority to commit torts. The moment he acted wrongfully
he abused his office or agency and acted iltr'a vircs, thus reliev-
ing the corporation of responsibility for his torts. Moreover,
it is necessary to observe that in principle, though with many
exceptions, the Roman law regarded only natural persons, not
corporations, as the subject of legal relations, a conception
which played a large part in delaying for centuries recognition
for the rule that corporations could be charged with responsi-
bility in tort.1 3 The principle of fault as the basis of responsi-
bility also served to fasten upon the continental law of state
responsibility the classic distinction between liability for unlaw-
ful and for lawful acts--a distinction disavowed and rejected
by many modern publicists and by some French cases-and also
attributing the power to commit tort and hence tort responsibility, to cor-
porations. 2 SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN f MISCHiEN REcTS (Berlin,
1840) 310 et seq; HAFTER, DIE DELIRTS UND STRAFFXHIG !VT DER PZ-
SONENVERBXNDE (Berlin, 1903) 25 ct seq; Maitland's translation, mpra
at =; 2 CuQ, LES INSTITUTIONS JURMIQUE DES ROLMUNS (Paris, 1902)
176; A. BAEcIA LoPrz, LA TEORiA GENER.AL DE LAtS PERSONAS JUnMlICAS Y
EL PROBLEMA DE SU RESPONSABILIDAD Crvm P0R ATos ILiciTos (Buenos
Aires, 1918) 221 et seq. The fiction theory of the corporation (nnivcr.itws)
in Roman law is by no means universally accepted. See S=Lm.Ls, Do
LA PERSONNALIrT JuRIDIQuE (Paris, 1910) Lect. V., 92 et scq. and other
jurists cited and quoted in 1 LEON MICHOUD, LA THCOnixE DE I%. PRSONNAL-
rrb MomluE. Paris, (Troboas', 2d ed. 1924) c. 1 and in B,%ncIA, z,-pra at
230 et, seq. Saleilles approaches the modern "real" or organ theory of
GIERKE. GIERxE, DIE GENOSSENSCHAFTSTHEORIE UND DIE DEUTSCHE REcHT-
SPRECHUNG (Berlin, 1887) 603 et scq; E. FREUND, TnE LEGAL NATURE OF
CORPORATIONS (New York, 1896) 10, 13.
12 N. MOMMSEN, ABRISS DES R6zISCHEN STAATSRECHTS (Leipzig, 2d ed.
1907) 83, who adds that even the act of the king, if not in lawful (or
rightful) representation of the people, is not deemed the act of the people.
The officer was personally liable before the civil courts, just as any private
tort-feasor. I MIOMMSEN, R6MLISCHES STAATSRECHT, (Leipzig, 2d ed. 1876)
673-674.
2 3 GIRKE, op. cit. s.pra note 10, at 341; 2 SAVIGNY, op. cit. supra note
11, at 2; E. RATRz, op. ci. supra note 11, at 0.
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served to bring about the application of rules of private law
to the solution of the problem of governmental responsibility.
Middle Ages. The Middle Age continental conception of the
legal relation betveen the group and the individual or officer
seems to have been diametrically opposed to that of the
Roman law. Whereas the Roman law regarded the organ-
ized group-unit (universitas)-not the societas, or partnership
-as a corporation with a legal (perhaps fictitious) personality
distinct from that of the individual members, the common folk-
law of the Middle Ages regarded the group as not a separate
entity but merely as the collectivity of the individual members,
whether applied to State or Church, community or manor, guild
or association. In Roman law the individual incurred no re-
sponsibility for the obligations of the group; in the common
folk-law he did. He was also deemed one of a group, each
member of which made the whole-all its members-liable.
While the group might under circumstances escape this liability
in solido by expelling the guilty member and surrendering him
for punishment, failure to expel involved an assumption of lia-
bility.14 Although cities sought with partial success to escape
such joint responsibility for the acts of their citizens, the Ger-
manic Middle Age conception that all the members of the group
could be held liable for the fault or obligation of a single mem-
ber prevailed.' "All for one and one for all" was both a legal
14 2 GIERKE (Berlin, 1873) op. cit. supra note 10, at 386, 522, 817 ot seq;
3 ibid. 168-171. The Canonists denied corporate responsibility in tort, ibid.
343, but had to yield. The legists admitted it, ibid. 402. Practice in the
sixteenth century on the continent admitted it, 4 ibid. 140. The criminal-
ists denied it, 4 ibid. 97. See also GiunKE, GENOSSENSCHAFTSTHEORIE (1887)
743 et seq; HAFTER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 7-11.
This phenomenon of non-differentiation between group and individual
responsibility goes back to primitive times. Early peoples attained ideals
of fraternity and solidarity unknown to modern western nations. Within
the group, communistic ideas prevailed; competition occurred between
groups, not between individuals in the group. An injury to a member was
an injury to the group; and the primitive group was responsible for the
acts of its members. These ideas of group responsibility prevailed through-
out considerable areas in the Middle Ages; with better organization in
cities and the differentiation of societal agents from ordinary members,
group responsibility became more narrowly confined to acts of societal
agents. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (New York, 3d Am. ed. 1873) 122; 1 GIERHE
(Berlin, 1868, 1873) op. cit. supra note 10, at 18; 2 ibid. 386; GETTELL,
HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT (New York, 1924) 32; KOHLER, PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW (Boston, 1914) 268 et seq. The principle of group or tribal re-
sponsibility for acts of individuals was adopted in our treaties with the
Indian tribes. See art. 4 of treaty with Cherokees, June 26, 1794, 7 Stat.
43; arts. 2 and 3 of treaty with Sacs, May 13, 1816, 7 Stat. 141; see
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 16 (U. S. 1831).
15 Cf. Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T. R. 667 (K. B. 1788); and comment
thereon in (1924) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1, 42-Government Liability
in Tort. In this case lack of incorporation and the assumed necessity
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institution and a popular slogan. A fortiori, the group became
liable in solido for the wrongful acts of an organ, agent or rep-
resentative of the group. Their act not only made them
liable personally, as in the Roman law, but their "will" was im-
puted to the group, which became capable of committing illegal
acts and was bound to assume responsibility therefor--concep-
tions quite foreign to the Roman law.10  In early Germanic
law the conception of the master's responsibility for the torts
of his serfs and domestics had been common; though when ser-
vants became free, surrender to the courts relieved the master. T
When the Roman law, resurrected through the revival of
learning at the Italian universities, made its way into western
Europe at the time of the so-called "Reception" (1495), these
competing principles of group immunity and group responsi-
bility necessarily contended for supremacy. Each has left
traces. The conflict of scientific theories with the social views
of the people produced interesting results. In the fourteenth
century, the postglossators asserted that in principle a cor-
poration could not be responsible for the torts of its representa-
tives unless, in membership assembled, it commanded the tort;
moreover, it could not commit an offense because it was not
strictly a persona.18 Yet the customs and views of the people
of levying on the individual member induced the court to hold a
county not liable. The continental city was from early days liable for the
acts of its officers, and the property of individuals in case of need was
levied upon. By the fourteenth century, cities seem to have thrown off
responsibility for acts merely of private citizens. 2 GiEIrn, op. cit. supra
note 10, at 817-20.
26 In times of public excitement, as in var, one occasionally finds traces
of this atavistic medievalism, which seeks to hold the group responsible for
acts of an individual member, or visits on an individual member penalties
for the acts of the group or of other members. See, for example, article
297 of the Treaty of Versailles, which by confiscating private property of
enemy investors, violated a century-old rule of international law. An ele-
ment of collective responsibility is still found in international law. Inter-
national law deems an injury to the citizen abroad as theoretically an in-
jury to his State. BORCHAED, DIPLOM ATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENs ABROAD
(1915) 351; see GmRE, op. cit. supra note 14, at 771, note 3.
17 2 BRUNNE, :DEUTSCHE RECHTSGESCHICIITE (Leipzig, 1892) § 93. WIG-
more, Responsibility for TortioPs Acts (1894) 7 HARV. L. RE%,. 315, 330.
18 See the quotations from Oldradus de Ponte and the celebrated Bartolus
de Sassoferrate noted by LONING, op. cit. supra note 3, at 34 and 3
Gierke, op. cit. supra note 10, at 402-405. See also the citations to Savigny,
Vangerow, Wachter'Windscheid, Dernburg and other leading Romanists in
Hafter, op. cit. supra note 11, at 7-11. Bartolus relied on two citations
from the Digest, 1. 16, par. 10, D. 48, 19, nos. 3 and 4: "sccundua
fctionem juris universitas aliud quam Iomines uni'crsitatis"; and 1niversi-
tas proprie non potest delinquere, quia proprie non cst pcrsona; taincn hoz
est fictura positum pro vero, sicut ponimus non juristar." See 3 GrmnIE ,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 234, 342, 402, 491, 656, 667, 678, 631, 738.
The change in view as to the corporation's power to commit torts came
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could not be finally suppressed by a legal theory, and theory
therefore had to come to the aid of an established social con-
viction. From the theory that all the members could make
the corporation Ifable came the view that the majority, or even
its organs, its managers, if authorized to represent the cor-
porate will, could do so. Bartolus supplied the argument that
the representatives had to remain within corporate functions
to bind the corporation and that the majority of the members
at least had to adopt the resolution or ratify the act. The
Roman universitas was drawn upon for analogies, though the
it constituted only the totality of its members. It did not,
however, absorb the individual and produce a reciprocal liabil-
ity in solido as did the Germanic association. The corporation
as a legal person having a so-called will, entity and a life com-
pletely independent of its members was still a conception of the
future.
The legal relation between the individual and the group ex-
perienced marked changes from the fifteenth century on. The
community is no longer liable for the individual, even when he
purports to act in the name of the community. The employed
and paid officer, however, may make the corporation or com-
-munity liable in so far as a principal is liable for the acts of an
agent, i. e. for negligence in selecting him (culpa in eligendo).
The post glossators insisted upon the extreme ultra vires theory
that the corporation could only be liable if it had expressly au-
"thorized the tort of the officer-a possibility finally admitted;
if it had not, it could not be liable. This view colored the legal
doctrine in France and Germany for a long period.19
Yet the customs and convictions of the people were not satis-
fied with this advance. From the fifteenth century on, there-
fore, analogies from the Roman law were sought to sustain the
popular demand for group responsibility on a wider scale. Dis-
tinctions were made between acts within and acts outside the
officer's functions or duties-not necessarily of his authority to
act rightfully. If within his functions, then the universitas,
the nearest Roman analogy, was deemed liable like the tax-
fermer for his subordinate, the paterfamilias for his uneman-
cipated son, the exercitor (principal) for the institor (mana-
ger), the mensor for his assistants, shipowners and innkeepers
for their employees. The analogies were rather far-fetched,
with the admission in the fifteenth century that the group was a porsona,
and thus capable of doing wrong. But responsibility for the unauthorized
torts of agents was a matter of slow growth and was hardly admitted
until the eighteenth century.
29 MESTRE, LES PERSONNES MORALES ET LE PROBLPMPE Dn LEUR RESPONSA-
BILITt PENALE (Paris, 1899) 109 et seq; 3 GnKnx,, op. cit. supra note 10, at
234-236, 738. - I I
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but they served the purpose of permitting the jurists to sustain
a popular legal institution. If the officer acted outside the
range of his functions, the corporation was not liable, only he
alone.20 This idea underlies the modern legal development in
France and several of the other countries of continental Europe.
The important point had been won that the acts of the officer
within the scope of his office were deemed to be the acts of the
corporation, of the community. But in the sixteenth century
the feudal lords were strong, and the doctrine of sovereignty
began to arise to strengthen their claims to territorial and
legal supremacy. They were loath to assume so broad a re-
sponsibility for the acts of their official employees, and again
the jurists came to the rescue with a sustaining theory. The
officer was deemed analogous to the Roman tax-fermer's slave,
for whose acts the fermer was liable only if he failed to sur-
render him, noxae dvtio.2  Hence the territorial lord was
deemed liable only when he failed to punish or expel the officer;
in that event ratification by silence was presumed. This un-
certain position prevailed until the end of the seventeenth cen-
tury. The popular view, however, that the State, the city, the
community and corporations, could be guilty of torts and even
of certain crimes was not abandoned, especially as it was not
uncommon to have communities fined or otherwise held liable
by the highest courts.
22
Still the jurists almost uniformly sought to limit the liability
of corporations; only a few wrongful acts of organs or officers
were deemed corporate acts-again a modified vltrot vires doc-
trine. Indeed, down to the early nineteenth century, Romanists
and criminalists insisted upon the theory that fault was per-
sonal and could not be ascribed to a corporation, though prac-
tice required the concession that statutes might exceptionally
otherwise provide. -3 The Roman law analogies for the liability
of the territorial lord or the community, and even the limita-
tion of liability by noxae datio were abandoned, and the doc-
trines of fault of the employing lord or community were re-
20 See the authorities cited in LOENING, op. cit. supra note 3, at 39 and
H. A. Zachariae, Ueber die Haftvcrbindliclil:cit des Staats az! Rccht3-
widrigen Handlungen and Unterlassungat scincr Bcamtcn (1863) 19
ZEITSCHR. PUn DIE GESAUMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT 5382, 5S84-590. Wyzs, op.
cit. supra note 4, at 57 et seq. See also HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Everyman's
Library ed.) 119. Bartolus had pointed out a distinction between corporate
and non-corporate torts, and anticipated the modern distinction between
the power and the privilege to commit torts. See Girnix, op. cit. c;pr
note 14, at 764, 769.
21'%yss, op. cit. supra note 4, at 62, 65; LOENING, op. cit. mtpr note 3,
at 40.
22 3 GIEMRKE, op. cit. supra note 10, at 343-350.
23 See the views of Savigny and Feurbach set out in H,-rcn, op. cit.
supra note 11, at 26-28.
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vived. Opinion and practice differed as to what degree of fault
was required-whether in selection (culpa in eligendo) or
supervision (culpa in custodiendo) or whether fault of the prin-
cipal was presumed from the fault of the agent. The mandate
or agency theory, as a private law theory familiar to all Rom-
anists, gained greater acceptance in explaining the relation be-
tween lord or group and the officer. Frequently, the extreme
ultra vires doctrine was revived. Either this theory or the
provable fault theory served generally to enable the lord or the
group to escape liability. In the late eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries the private law theory of agency, notably its Roman
law limitations, was greatly weakened as the basis of the official
relation. There arose instead vigorous supporters of the view
that the relation between state or group and officer and between
group, officer and individual was not one of private law, but
of public law, which was to be governed by considerations, not
of an inapplicable Roman law, but of modern social, politi-
cal and legal theory.
The jurists of the school of natural law, with their emphasis
upon the rights of the individual, were influential in sustaining
the theory of corporate torts. They differed in their view of
the degree and conditions of responsibility-whether non-voting
members of the group were liable, how far the assembly could
bind the members. Some, notably Bodin and Hobbes, believed
that rules of corporate responsibility could not extend to sover-
eign groups or persons.2' Nor were tort and crime, which histori-
cally bear close affinity in all legal systems, always distinguished
-a failure which worked to the disadvantage of corporate tort
responsibility. Indeed, many Romanists of the eighteenth cen-
tury adopted the old view that the universitas, being incapable
of a will-even at best one for rightful purposes only-was in-
capable of tort.25  Against them stood the folk law and com-
munity practice, the natural law jurists who defended the in-
dividual's liberty against the group and even against the
sovereign, and, in the nineteenth century, the school of jurists
who conceived the corporation as having an independent exist-
ence, with a will of its own and legal capacity to commit torts,
and thus responsible, not vicariously for the acts of third per-
sons or even agents, but directly for its own acts performed
by its organs. Statutes and courts, influenced by theory or
24 3 BODIN, DE REPUBLICA (1576) c. 7 (London, Knolles ed. 1606) 361
et seq; 4 GiERKE, op. cit. supra note 10, at 332 et seq. HOBBES, op. Cit.
supra note 20, at 121-124. This view was shared by others, e.g. Besold
(1577-1638) quoted in 4 GIERKE 12. Grotius had no difficulty in attrib-
uting tort responsibility to corporations and sovereigns. 2 DE Juum
BELLI AC PACIS (1625) c. 21 §§ 2-4, 7-8, 10 (London, Evats' ed. 1682).
25 See the references to this group in GiERKnE, op. cit. supra note 14, at
745, note 1; 3 GIERKE, op. cit. supra note 10, at 168.
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reflecting popular convictions, gradually, though often reluc-
tantly, enlarged the scope of group responsibility in tort; prac-
tice and science supplied the supporting theoriesY
English Common Law. In the common law down to modern
times we also find the prevailing conception that liability was
based on fault and that fault, like carelessness, was personal.
It also appears that responsibility for the uncommanded torts
of servants or agents came into the law only in comparatively
recent times. Holdswolth mentions the early notion that a
master was responsible for the wrongful acts of his slaves and
a father for his children, much as in the Roman lawY.
2  But
from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when the earliest
authentic records of the common law commence, down to the
time of Lord Holt (1688) the servant did not apparently malhe
the master liable unless the latter had commanded or ratified
the tort, a principle which also e-tended to crimes.. '- Holds-
worth mentions certain exceptions where liability was imposed
on grounds of public policy-the liability for damage by fire
from one's house; the liability of persons in public callings, be-
cause they undertake to show skill and competence, like inn-
keepers, carriers, surgeons, etc; the statutory liability of
sheriffs and bailiffs for their subordinates; and certain excep-
tions under the law merchant and by custom.20 The canon law,
largely influenced by the civil law, seems to have been more
friendly to vicarious liability than the common law.= ' For us,
the interesting evidence is that there seems to have been
greater willingness to recognize vicarious responsibility of the
master in the case of a public service or calling, on the ground
that he professed or undertook to exercise his calling compe-
tently and skillfully,3 than in other types of cases. The de-
26 See GmRKE, op. cit. supra note 14, at 750 ct scq. and notes; LMI;N;G,
op. cit. supra, note 3, at 40 et seq; ZACHARIAE, op. cit. supra note 20, at 590
et seq.
272 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY or ENGLISH LAW (London, 3d ed. 1922) 47.
28 3 HOLDSWORTH (3d ed. 1923) op. cit. supra- note 27, at 371, n. 9; WIG-
MORE, op. cit. supra, note 17, at 382 et seq; BAT,; VICaIous LI2nILITy
(London, 1916) 12 et seq. Baty asserts that Wigmore's authorities from
cases in the Year Books to show that the master was recognized as responsi-
ble down to the fifteenth century, are "not very convincing." Many of them
are within the exceptions to the rule of non-responsibility mentioned by
Holdsworth. But even Wigmore admits that by the sixteenth century civil
liability for uncommanded wrongs had disappeared.
2'9 3 HorSworTH, op. cit. svpra note 27, at 385.
so SAINT GERMAIN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT (1701) e. xlii, p. 230 quoted by
BATY, op. cit. supra note 28, at 15. Even the canon law, however, seems to
have denied responsibility if the office was a public (State) function.
31 In the case of Waltham v. Mlulgar, 1 Moore, 770 (K. B. 1600) a ship-
owner was held not liable for the wrongful act of his crew in attacIing,
under letters of marque, a friendly vessel. Dodderidge believed that as this
was a public matter, the owner was liable for the acts of his crew. Pop-
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parture from the traditional view began in 1709 when Lord
Holt in Hem v. Nichols32 decided that a merchant in England
was responsible for fraud perpetrated by an agent abroad in
selling certain goods. This case and Lord Holt have been
severely criticized, partly on the ground that actually the wrong
was a breach of contract, a breach of that confidence which
third persons were justified in reposing in an agent held out
tO represent the principal. Yet Holt's decisions and dicta un-
doubtedly led to an enlargement of the principal's liability for
the negligence of his servants,3 3 naturally without express com-
mand. The responsibility was explained on the theory that the
master had impliedly authorized the tort-a specious indulgence
in judicial fiction which survived for practically a century.
Commerce and social utility having justified the expediency of
the rule, the efforts of the courts in the nineteenth century are
confined mainly to working out its application, namely, in de-
terining under what circumstances the wrongdoing employee
or servant can be deemed to be acting within "the scope of his
employment." 3- Certain aspects of this problem which affect
official torts and the various theories on which the doctrine of
respondeat superior is justified, will be reserved for later dis-
cussion.
Corporateness was a comparatively late development in Eng-
lish law. Early forms of group-life had no need for the con-
ception, and collective and communal ownership and various
forms of communitas existed without the notion.35 Corporate-
ness first seems to have attached to the English borough, prob-
ably without the aid of the Roman conception. The Roman or
rather Italian theory developed by the postglossators proved
useful to assure the group security in the holding of property
in perpetuity and to protect the associates cloaked in the per-
sona of the group-name, against crime and tort. Through the
channel of the ecclesiastical law and through Bracton, Coke
established the Italian conception of the persona ficta, a postu-
lated concession from the State, as an institution of the com-
mon law.8
ham, C. J. evidently considered it as private, and denied the owner's
responsibility. BATY, op. cit. supra note 28, at 16, states that the case
turned "upon the consideration of its public character."
32 1 Salk. 289.
3 See Turberville v. Stampe, 2 Ld. Raym. 264 (1697) and other cases
discussed by BATY, op. cit. supra note 28, at 21 et seq.
34 See WiGmmRE, op. cit. supra note 17, at 339 et seq.
35 F. W. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY BOOK AND BEYOND (Cambridge, 1897)
356; 1 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (Cambridge,
1899) 494-5; CAU, op. cit. supra note 11, at 130 et seq.
36 This development is traced by CAPn, op. cit. supra note 11, at 155 et seq.
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There are several cases in the Year BooksZ in which trespass
lay against a mayor and commonalty. Yet for the most part
writers on the period between 1400 and 1800 maintain that
corporations cannot be sued in tort.*s The grounds for this
immunity are those which had already been made familiar by
the Roman lawyers-that a tort presumed a personal act of
will of which the mindless corporation in its collective capacity
is incapable; that for the representative of the corporation to
commit a tort was obviously ltr 'i res, for it existed only for
the rightful purposes of its charter. It was even denied that a
corporation could have servants in the same sense as an indi-
vidual. It seems that courts in the United States, in the early
nineteenth century, first challenged these metaphysical argu-
ments and gradually began to place the corporation in the same
position as the individual with respect to tort responsiblity.23
After 1834 it became practically settled in England that a cor-
poration could be held liable in tort, though the first cases in-
volved questions of enrichment of the corporation by a tort. -'
The mindless corporation as a touchstone of debate was
abandoned, for it led naturally to the conclusion that a corpora-
tion could not be liable even in contract. In fact the agency
theory of vicarious liability was expanded in England beyond
that prevailing in several countries of continental Europe; and
concurrently there developed an ever-increasing degree of tort
responsibility of corporations, not only in trespass and trover,
but for other torts, including malicious prosecution, fraud and
deceit, and libel.4 ' There was no longer any doubt as to the
37 Quoted by 1 KXYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ConRooATIoNs (London,
1793) 223-225, and cited by Tilghman, J. in Chestnut Hill & Spring House
Turnpike Co. v. Rutter, 4 Serg. & R. 6, 17 (Pa. 1S18).
38 1 BAcoN's AmREGE'MENT, s. V. Corp. E. 2, 5, 4:3 c (5th ed. 178G) Z97,
509; KYD, op. cit. supra note 37, at 225.
39 Chestnut Hill etc. Co. v. Rutter, supra note 37; Firzt Baptist
Church v. Schenectady R. R., 5 Barb. 79 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1848); N. Y.
Tel. Co. v. Dryburg, 35 Pa. St. 293 (1860).
40 Smith v. Birmingham Gas Co., 1 Ad. & E. 526 (K. B. 1834); 3Maund v.
Mlonmouthshire Canal Co., 4 Man. & G. 452 (C. P. 1842). The distinction
between trover and trespass appears to have been overloohed by Tindal,
J. BAT, op. cit, supra note 28, at 65-00; SMITH, op. cit. smpra note 11, at
59 et seq.
4 Whitfield v. South-Eastern Ry., 27 L. J. Q. B. 229 (1858) ; Barwic: v.
Eng. Joint Stock Bk., L. R. 2 Ex. 259 (1867); see cases noted in BATY, op.
cit. supra note 28, at 68 et seq; SMITH, op. cit. supra note 11, at 61 t ctq;
Laski, The Personality of Association-s (1916) 29 HAIv. L. REv. 404, 413;
Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability (1916) 26 YMu LAW Joun.%L, 105,
123.
In England, the doctrine of ultra rises seems to have caused the courts
more difficulty than has been the case in the United Statez. Distinctions
seem still to be made in England between the chartered company and the
registered statutory company. The former is more readily deeracd capable
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application to them of the law of master and servant,4- and in
fact for deliberate acts of trespass as distinguished from neg-
ligence, there was less reluctance to hold the corporation than
the individual employer. The fiction of "implied authority"
seemed more easy of application to corporations. 43 The wide
extension of corporate liability in tort has led naturally to a
demand for the application of the same rules with respect to
the unincorporated association, and it is highly probable that
the early future will eradicate the important distinction
deemed to rest upon the technicality of registration.
4
4
It is thus apparent that in continental Europe, the fiscus-
the State or other public entity in its corporate, as distinguished
from its governmental, capacity and as an owner of property-
was both suable and liable on doctrines derived from private
law. Group responsibility for the torts of agents was greatly
aided by the conception of the corporation, its supposed posses-
sion of "personality" and "will" and the application to it of
the doctrines of direct responsibility for its organs and indirect
responsibility for the torts of its agents. These conceptions be-
came applicable to all public corporations from the State to
the smallest organized township, in so far as non-governmental
functions were involved. Responsibility in respect of "govern-
mental" functions is a comparatively late development, still in
progress, which owes its existence to the fact that certain
of tort in ultra wires undertakings. The defense of ultra vires is only
rarely permitted in the United States so far as the undertaking is con-
cerned, though of course the officer or employee may act ultra wires his
authority. Professors Warren and Harno suggest the conceptual distinction
between capacity (power) and authority (privilege) to commit torts in
ultra vires enterprises. The corporation seems to be more closely limited
in matters of contract. The enlargement of tort responsibility seems in
the interests of good public policy. See the valuable article of Professor
Harno, Privileges and Powers of a Corporation and the Doctrine of Ultra
Vires (1925) 35 YALE: LAW JOURNAL, 13; SALbiOND, LAw OF ToRTs (London,
3d ed. 1912) 58-60; Warren, Torts by Corporations in Ultra Vires Under-
takings (1925) 2 CADIBRIDGE L. J. 180 and the comment thereon by A. L.
Goodhart, Corporate Liability in Tort and the Doctrine of Ultra Vires
(1926) ibid. 350.
42 Citizen's Life Assurance Co. v. Brown [1904] A. C. 423, 426; CARR, op.
cit. supra note 11, at 78 et seq; Laski, The Personality of Associations, supra
note 41, at 414. Under the "real" theory of the corporation now adopted
to a considerable extent in continental Europe, largely through the influence
of Gierke, it is unnecessary to invoke the principle of vicarious liability
through agents, for the corporation becomes directly liable through its
organs. GIERKE, op. cit. supra note 14, at 788.
43 BATY, op. cit. supra note 28, at 85, 87 et seq., and cases there quoted
and cited.
44 W. A. Sturges, Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Actions
(1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 383; Laski, The Personality of Associatio-i,
supra note 41, at 416; Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, svpra note
41, at 125.
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jurists, notably Gierke and Duguit, have refused to admit any
theoretical justification for a distinction between corporate and
"cgovernmental" acts of public officials. All this will be more
fully discussed hereafter. At this point, it is interesting to
observe that there has been little difficulty in applying these con-
ceptions, in the United States and England, to municipal cor-
porations and public corporations generally, other than the State
and its unincorporated subdivisions. The alleged justifications
for the exception of the Crown and State from these conceptions
are unique to Anglo-American law, a sufficient reason to question
their logical conclusiveness and their historical or theoretical
bases. An historical examination will therefore be made of the
grounds and arguments advanced in Anglo-American law for
the doctrine of irresponsibility.
THE KING CAN DO NO WRONG
The immunity of the State in tort has been justified in the
United States on one of two principal legal theories; the first,
that the king-erroneously transformed into the State-can do
no Nwrong, 3 a doctrine evidently deemed to have an immutable
historical foundation; and the second, espoused primarily by
Mr. Justice Holmes for the Supreme Court " that the State, the
authority that makes the law, cannot be subject to law, and
hence, it is argued, cannot be chargeable with or sued in tort.
The second of these theories will be discussed hereafter. The
first, that "the king can do no wrong" has apparently been
accepted so generally as an axiom that it may occasion surprise
to remark that the doctrine rests upon a serious misconception
of the origin of the dictum
7
The middle ages, even in places remote from the influence
of the Roman law, appear to have had a definite conception of
private rights and a profound conviction that an impairment or
violation thereof by public authority constituted a wrong for
which redress must be accorded. The doctrine of acquired or
vested rights was firmly established in medieval law, and was
45 Gibbons v. United States, 8 Wall. 269 (1869) ; Morgan v. United States,
14 Wall. 53 (1871); Langford v. United States, 101 U. S. 341 (1879); H.
Barry, The King Can Do No WTong (1925) 11 VA. L. REV. 349; J. H.
Morgan, Renzedies Against the Crown, introductory chapter to G. E. ROBL-
SoN, PUBLIC AuTHorrms AND LEGAL LmAsmrry (London, 1925) liv. Other
legal theories, notably alleged public policy, will be considered hereafter.
46 Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349, 353, 27 Sup. Ct. 526, 527
(1907) ; The Western Maid, 257 U. S. 419, 433, 42 Sup. Ct. 159, 161 (1922).
47The early history of proceedings against the crown has been investi-
gated and published in a notable monograph by LutJwK EHnLIC, Pro-
CEEDINGS AGAINST THE CROWN (1216-1377) (Oxford, 1921). For much
of the historical material which follows the writer aclmowledges his spe-
cial indebtedness to the researches of Dr. Ehrlich.
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kept alive by the jurists of the school of natural law. From these
conceptions in England, the king and his officials were by no
means exempt; on the contrary, the individual was deemed as
privileged in the enjoyment of his rights against the king as
against any other person. 48 While many rights rested in grant,
they were deemed vested, and could not be extinguished, even by
the king, except by what would now be called due process of law.
Magna Carta was designed to insure respect for the rights of the
lord and vassal (subject) in his relations with the suzerain
(king) ; and while many rules of law favored the king and were
interpreted in his favor by the king's courts, it seems certain that
the king's acts were judged according to law, and that the sup-
position that the king was above the law did not prevail in
thirteenth century England. The infallible and irresponsible
king was a conception of later days and was historically unjus-
tified. It is true that a writ did not lie against the king, but
methods, partly indirect, were found to restore the subject to
the rights of %vhich the acts of the king or his officials had de-
prived him. The king was often charged with committing
wrong, notably wrongful disseisin.49  The bulk of the com-
plaints against the king's acts related to wrongs with respect
to land, and the courts frequently issued writs restoring the
status quo ante.5°
The king had a dual position, personal and institutional. As
the head of a great administrative machine, governmental, fis-
cal and judicial, his powers were enormous, and probably only
the popular conviction that it was improper for him to with-
draw himself from the domain of law led to his reliance upon
legal arguments and not merely physical power to defend his
acts. But that he could so rely and often did so is not hard to
48 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE
TImE OF EDWARD I (Cambridge, 1905) 3-4; EHRLIOH, op. cit. supra note 47,
at 9 et seq; 2 HOLDSWoRTH, op. cit. supra note 27, at 253 et $eq.
4 See the cases from BRACTON'S N TE BOOK cited by EHRLICH, op. cit.
supra note 47, at 14. Ehrlich remarks that the king as a disseisor had no
more rights than any other disseisor and thus conveyed no valid title to
a subsequent grantee. See MAGNA CARTA, c. 39, 52, 56, 57; W. S. MoKECII-
NIE, MAGNA CARTA (Glasgow, 2d ed. 1914) 375, 382, 448, 456, 457. The
king's unlawful grant or order gave no protection; later the proceedings
upon scire facias resulted in the annulment of letters patent to land which
the king was not privileged to convey. It was only later that the theory
developed that the king could not (was not privileged to) be a disseisor,
which led to an unsound interpretation of the maxim that "the king can
do no wrong." In modern times in England, the petition of right has long
been recognized to lie against the Crown's wrongful disseisin, though ih
the United States that flagrant tort when committed on behalf of the State,
is still unredressed, under the general immunity of the State in tort. Lang-
ford v. United States, supra note 45.
Go See the numerous writs from the Close Rolls described by EHRLICIl, op.
cit. supra note 47, at 15 et seq.
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believe. The king's writ was prevented from becoming a
tyrant's weapon largely by reason of the fact that it was issued
under judicial control. Yet obviously it could not run against
the king, the nominal if not factual issuing authority, to any
greater extent than he chose. Punishment, the usual expia-
tion for wrongs, could hardly be invoked against the king, and
this probably accounts for the fact that damages, with their
penal connotation, were not assessed against the king. Pos-
sibly, also, money then played a smaller part in life than it
does today, so that we hear less of money damages in general.
Writs for the restoration of rights in land were returnable in
the exchequer, and to their issuance the king offered no objec-
tion. Yet it could not be said that he thereby submitted to the
jurisdiction of his courts.51 Nor could the king be punished or
51 Holdsworth states that neither the king nor a lord could be sued in
his own courts. 3 HoLDswor TH, op. cit. svzpia note 27, at 464-165; see alco
STAUNFoRD, PREGOGATIVE (London, 1567) f. 25b. But, 3 C,.=,YLX, HisronY
op RIEDIEvAL POLITIcAL THEORY IN THE WEST (Edinburgh, 1909) c. 4,
quotes from the CoNSUETUDINES FEODORUM, the SACIISENSPIEGEL, LE Co:.su,
DE PIERRE DE FONTAINES, the ETABLiSSEMIENTS DE ST. LoUIs, from Beau-
manoir and from other feudal law book passages which show that in the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries it was a common conception that the
feudal lord could be impleaded in the lord's court and that appropriate
measures were available to the vassal to enforce the judgment. See also K.
WOLZENDOEFF, STAATSRECHT UND NATURRECHT IN DER LEHE vo N WIDan-
STANDSRECHT DES VoLKEs GEGEN RECHTSWIDRIGE AuStIBUNG DER STAATSE-
WALT (Breslau, 1916) 6-23. In continental Europe, it was the common prac-
tice for both king and feudal lord to submit to the jurisdiction of the courti.
LOENING, GERICHTE U VERWALTUNGSBEHURDEN IN BRANDEN-URG-PCuSSrN
(1894) 2 VERWALTUNGSARCHIV, 217, 437 and 3 ibid. 94 states that in central
Europe the princes and lords could in theory after the twelfth century be
sued before the Reichshofsgo-icht, but that in practice the procedure was so
difficult that suits were not brought. The right of resistance to illegal royal
acts was conceded to cities, 2 ibai 217. See also following articles in this
series. In the fifteenth century arbitration courts were established to try
controversies against princes. 2 ibid. 221. The territorial or lord's courts
were then not competent to try cases against the lord. But see 3 CAnL.7,
loc. cit. After 1495, the imperial Reichs:amnmcrgcricht had jurisdiction of
suits against territorial lords, but the procedure was extremely complicated.
Suits against the king were possible before the Rcichslzofrath up to the
time of Frederick William I of Prussia in the eighteenth century. LoE:UN*G,
in 2 VERWALTUNGS.AiRCHIv, 228, citing J. J. Mlosan, MEKWC UIGE REIcus-
HOFKATHS CONCLUSA (1726). In the course of the seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries the power of the territorial rulers increased and the
influence and power of the imperial supreme court vanished. Subjects in
Brandenburg brought suit against the ruler before the council established
by him. LOENING, in 2 VERWALTUNGSArCHrv, 233. Suits against rulers in
that territory could not be brought before the ordinary courts during the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, except in certain corporate (fisczes)
matters. In the early eighteenth century, the jurisdiction of the courts
was continually more limited, but administrative courts were created to
deal with specific matters, like taxation. Ibid. 243. Yet in matters of
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distrained for refusing to obey his court's, i. e. his own, orders,
a fact which explains why the barons sought to impose such a
compulsory jurisdiction12 and why the acts of the king's ser-
vants, unless the king waived his royal privilege, were free from
judicial review.53  When the king's acts were in question, re-
course to him was necessary; hence, though the conception of
wrong was clear, the ordinary suit against the king was hardly
practicable. Yet he did not claim immunity for his acts or
assert arbitrary power. At least down to 1276, a written peti-
tion for redress was not yet an established procedure, we are
informed.5 4 Bracton speaks of the supplicatio,5 but its use is
shrouded in doubt and by the time of Edward I, it seems that
the petitio in the sense of petition and not of ordinary com-
property, under ordinance of 1713, the ordinary courts were competent in
suits against the king of Prussia. Frederick the Great restored the juris-
diction of the ordinary courts over the king and withdrew jurisdiction
from the administrative courts. Suits could freely be brought against the
king under the Instruction of May 20, 1748. Ibid. 258. Subsequently,
administrative courts were re-established. 'Whereas suits in corporate
(fiscus) matters could still be brought, sometimes in the ordinary, some-
times in the administrative courts, suits against the king in "governmental"
matters could no longer, under the decrees of 1804 and following years, be
brought. Ibid. 456. An ordinance of 1808 restored the jurisdiction of the
ordinary courts in all corporate (fiscus) matters. 3 ibid. 94. In the Rhine
provinces, an ordinance of 1818 limits this jurisdiction, and under the
influence of the French law recourse against police ordinances is denied.
Ibid. 96. During the nineteenth century, until legislative reforms extended
jurisdiction over "governmental" functions, the jurisdiction of the ordinary
courts, with the exception of tax appeals, was practically limited to suits
arising out of the corporate functions of king and State. Ibid. 99 ot seq.
Suits against the police for damages arising out of illegal police orders
were permitted in administrative courts in 1840. Ibid. 131. But, as in
France up to 1870, suits against officials depended upon administrative
consent by the government. Toward the end of the century, far-reaching
legislative reforms opened the way to judicial suit against the State to
individuals injured by officers even in the performance of "governmental"
functions. For the historical development in central Europe of the suability
of king and State, see also 0. BAHR, DER RECIITSSTAAT (Cassel, 1864) 4, 18,
45, 111, and F. STEIN, GRENZEN UND BEZIEHUNCEN ZWISCHEN JUSTIZ UND
VERWALTUNG (Tiibingen, 1912) 6 et seq.
52 Clause 49 of the Articles of the Barons was designed to effect this
submission. MCKECHNIE, op. cit. supra note 49, at 492. See EHRLICH, op.
cit. supra note 47, at 25 et seq.
53 2 BRACTON'S NOTE-BOOK, p1. 401 (London, Maitland's ed. 1887) 320,
cited by EHRLICH, op. cit. supra note 47, at 25, note 1.
54 EHRLICH, op. cit. supra note 47, at 28; W. S. Holdsworth, The History
of Remedies Against the Crown (1922) 38 L. Q. REv. 141, 142 et seq; 9
HoLDSwORTH, op. cit. supra note 27, at 7 et seq.
55 1 BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINES ANGLIAE (London, Twiss'
ed. 1878) fol. 5b, 171b, pp. 40-41; 3 ibid. 92-93; EHRLICH, op. cit. supra
note 47, at 45; 1 POL.OCK & MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 48, at 501; BRAc-
TON'S NOTE-BOOK, op. cit. supra note 53, Case 1108 (1234); Holdsworth,
op. cit. supra note 54, at 143; 9 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 27, at 13.
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plaint had come into use. Yet it was possible to obtain relief
against a sheriff and bailiff in the administrative court known
as the exchequer,-3 unless the king interfered by assuming re-
sponsibility for the act, an interference operating analogously
to the modern "act of state" doctrine and to the proceeding in
continental countries by which the claim of act of administra-
tion serves to oust the jurisdiction of the ordinary law courts.
Undue exactions by the exchequer seem also to have been tri-
able by a writ from chancery addressed to the exchequer, issued.
in the time of Edward I, on petition to the king and councilY7
While there was no difficulty about having wrongfully-taken land
restored, and trying titles which rested upon alleged illegal
grants, it was extremely difficult to get money restored or money
compensation paid. Compensation in other form appears to have
been freely made, as in land and public privileges or franchises
of various kinds; and it also appears that set-off against or as-
signment of money due the exchequer by the claimant or by third
persons was not infrequentos Finally, applications to the king
in council or in person were occasionally made and redres
afforded.
Bracton, to whom we owe much of our knowledge of the law.- of
this period, is not altogether clear in his description of royal
privileges and responsibilities." Bracton, although he pictured
the king as the vicar of God i ter; po'albus, and thus laid a
56 1 POLLOCK & 31AITLAND, op. cit. s2upra note 48, at 192. The exchequer
issued the writ; it could try only wrongful acts of officials subordinate to
the exchequer, like sheriffs and bailiffs.
57 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, op. cit. s2pra 2zotc 48, at 192. It seems unneces-
sary to discuss the various writs in detail. Writs granted by the king
often began with "monstrarcrit nobis." Vinogradoff discusses these writs
in ViLLAI-NAGE IN ENGLAND (1892) 103-104; see 1 PoLLOCK & MuITLAuN,
op. cit. supra note 48, at 195 et seq. Writs from chancery naturally gave
rise to jurisdictional conflicts.
38 EHRLICH, op. cit. szipra note 47, at 32.
c9 This is explained by the fact that conflicting theories, legal and
political, kept the practice in a state of flux. Subjection to law contended
for mastery with the claim of royal prerogative. 1 POLLOCK & MlTL.'uD,
op. cit. supra note 48, at 526. Vinogradoff in a learned article on The Tcxt
of Bracton (1885) 1 L. Q. REV. 189, 199 points out the differences in some
of the Bracton manuscripts and in discussing f. 34 remarks that two of the
versions of f. 34 sustain diverse theories. The one, written evidently by
Bracton, admits that only God and the law are above the king and if he
breaks the law, only God can correct him. In the other, the king's peers
are recognized as his superiors when they act as the body of his court,
and they are expected to keep the king within the bounds of the law. The
conflict of theory is probably also illustrated by Bracton's assertion that the
king's power extends only as far as the law grants; yet, he adds, qeod
principi placuit, legis 1wbet vigorcm, which Bracton seems not to consider
inconsistent. 2 BRACTON, op. cit. supra note .55, fol. 107, at 172-173. For
a discussion of this supposed maxim of Roman law, see the subsequcnt
articles of this series.
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legal foundation for the claim of divine right, nevertheless re-
gards the king as distinctly subject to law which gave him his
position.6 0  If he should abuse his legal privileges and rely upon
physical power to enforce his desires, he was not a servant of
God but of the devil.6 1 Probably a modern Austinian would
point out that this described only a moral obligation and not a
legal duty, yet he would only thereby circumscribe narrowly
the conception of law and would not explain that breach of the
obligation and the flouting of popular convictions would prob-
ably disclose more violent sanctions than any mere departure
from a statutory requirement or judicially enforceable duty.
The maxim that the king can do no wrong 2 was understood by
Bracton not in the sense that he was incapable of doing wrong,
but that he was not privileged to do wrong. His acts in viola-
tion of law, by a standard which applied equally to everybody
else, were regarded not as lawful acts but as injuriae, wrongs;
his obligation to right the wrong or afford redress was not
deemed different from that of a private person . 3 Yet the
remedies, in the nature of things, could not be the same, though
the analytical jurist who would thereupon conclude that the
obligation was not legally recognizable would probably misin-
terpret both the practice and the popular conviction. If res-
toration was possible, this was expected and usually secured;
but the punishment of the ordinary wrongdoer could hardly
be applied to the king, or by analogy, the penal equivalent of an
amercement in damages. If the king refused to redress a
wrong, a possibility not readily accepted, the remedies were
necessarily weak. Bracton, as already observed, speaks of the
supplicatio to the king and in Edward I we have the formal
petitio. If he still refused, Bracton charges him with a breach
60 Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et sub lege, quia lex facit
Iregem. 1 BRACTON, op. cit. supra note 55, fol. 5b at 38-39. This view that
the law makes the king, not the king, the law, plays a part in the history of
jurisprudence. It involves some ambiguity in the term "law." See subse-
quent articles of this series.
61 1 BRACTON, op. cit. supra note 55, fol. 5b, 107b, at 40-41; 2 ibid. 174-
175; EHRLICH, op. cit. supra note 47, at 40.
62 Bracton uses the sentence: Nihil enim aliud potest rex in ter'rs
nisi id solur quod de jure potest. 2 BRACTON, op. cit. supra note 55, fol.
107a, at 172-173. The king's violations of private rights were spoken of as
if anybody else had committed them. See the numerous quotations from
Bracton, in support of this statement, printed by EHRLICH, op. cit. supra
note 47, at 42, note 2.
63 6 BRACTON, op. cit. supra note 55, fol. 382b, at 18-21; EiRLicil, op. cit.
supra note 47, at 43. But, as in real actions, the defendant could not vouch
the king to warranty unless by way of exception; since no writ lay against
the king, he could only pray aid of the king. Y. B. 21 & 22 Edw. I (Rolls
Series) 287 (1293) ; see 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 48, at
501, citing BRACTON's NOTE-BooK, Case 1183.
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of his mission and states that he ought to be punished, not of
course by any organized tribunal within the kingdom, but by
his religious superiors, possibly the pope or councilc4 This
was not an innocuous threat in those days. Bracton also evi-
dently sustained the privilege of popular resistance to out-
rageous abuse, on the theory that the king's debauch carried
with it the doom of the people.- There is even an intimation
in Bracton, notwithstanding his belief that the king's judges
were his own delegates, that another body, the curia, the earls
and the barons, who had claimed the right to exert compulsion
upon the kingp might in case of gross abuse, judge the legality
of his acts.
It is thus fairly certain that the subsequently proclaimed con-
ception of an infallible and irresponsible sovereign, himself
above the law because he makes it, finds no authority in the
kingship of Henry III or in Bracton's commentaries on medieval
English law.
Edward I, the so-called English Justinian, introduced a
regular course of procedure for bringing claims against the
king. This is identified with the institution of the petition, the
origin of which is ascribed to Edward's experience of foreign
practices, notably that adopted at the court of the pope in
Rome.6  It seems certain that the idea that the king was
deemed subject to and not above the law, that he was not
privileged to do wrong, and that his or his officials' interference
with vested rights had to be made good and remedied, were
prevalent legal conceptions of the period. The main interest
then lies in an examination of the procedure by which relief
was afforded the injured individual.
There is a well-known passage in the Year-Books which re-
cords the introduction of the new procedure by petition, though
it is probably inaccurate in assuming that the king could there-
tofore be sued by writ.15  This seems never to have been the
64 1 BRACTON, op. cit. szupra note 55, fol. 5b, 171b, also Ca, at 3S-'9; ibi4.
40-41; 3 ibid. 92-93; EHnnICH, op. cit. supra note 47, at 46. St13 mf'fli
ei ad poena quod donzinum c.,.pectat v:tor 'c. Ncyizo quidem de facC.-
(suis, regis) praesumat disputare, iindto fo;'tris contra fat u, m,,
venire. (fol. 5b, 6a). This vengeance of the Lord was evidently deemed
a most serious sanction.
65 2 BRAcTON, op. cit. supra note 55, fol. 107b, at 174-173. On the doc-
trine of resistance to abuse, sanctioned throughout the middle agez, cee M
WOLZENDORFF, op. cit. mtpra note 51, at 23 ct seq. and the subzcquEnt
articles of this series.
6 Provisions of Odord, 43 Hen. I (1258); 2 W. SrUBBS, Thu Co:sr i-
TUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND (Oxford, 4th ed. IS96) 7S ct scq; XALG,.
CARTA, c. 61; McKECHNIE, op. cit. sapra note 49, at 465.
C7 See the inference, based on historical data, of EHLiciH, op. cit. 51!p21
note 47, at 95.
6s Passeley, 1307, in the course of an argument before the Court of
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case. The fact that relief had to be sought in the method pre-
scribed, usually extended only after endorsement of fiat justitia
or soit fait droit or facent droit as parties, does not, it is be-
lieved, militate against the popular conception that these claims
were based on law and that the obligations they evoked were
legal and not merely moral in nature. While it is true that
.justice often functioned slowly and inadequately, particularly
in the collection of money claims, and while it was difficult to
invoke judicial action if the king defiantly refused to meet an
obligation-not a common case-still an assumption by Austin-
ians that the relief was not legal but gracious is based on their
exceedingly narrow definition of the term "law." An equally
justifiable and broader definition of the term "law" would em-
brace a regular course of action by societal agents, predictable
and sanctioned by popular conviction, departure from which
was rare and admittedly evidence of bad faith. The precedents
established were apparently as much respected as are the pre-
cedents, for example, of the United States Court of Claims, the
decisions of which cannot be enforced except as Congress sees
fit to make appropriations. But the regularity with which this
is done establishes the practice, it is believed, as legal, and not
merely ethical or moral; and the rules laid down, as rules of
law.
So, it is believed, we may characterize the regular form of
proceedings against the king for the redress of wrongs adopted
by Edward I and his advisers. To be sure, the king had cer-
tain prerogatives, continually growing in importance, which
placed him in some respects outside the customs and laws of
the realm applying to other persons. The exceptional way of
suing him was one of these. Costs did not lie against him,"'
and time did not run against him. These privileges were
deemed justified on the ground of public utility. In disseisin,
he paid no damages and he could, of course, not be punished.
But he did not profess to escape ordinary legal obligations. For
excessive revenue collections, writs were sued out of chancery
addressed to the barons of the exchequer. Although disseisin
by the king is no longer mentioned, we have writs ordering
escheators, sheriffs, etc. to remove the king's hands from lands
Common Pleas said: "In old times every writ, whether of right or of the
possession, lay well against the king, and nothing is now changed except
that one must now sue against him by bill -where formerly one sued by
writ." Y. B. 33-35 Edw. I (London, Rolls Series 1879) 470-471; 1 POLL0IC
& MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 48, at 501, 516 et seq; 3 HOLDSWoRTIH
op. cat: supra note 27, at 465.
69 3 Bl. Comm. *400; G. S. ROBERTSON, CIVIL PROCEEDINGS BY AND AGAINST
THE CROWN (London, 1908) 397, 613. Under the Petition of Right Act,
1860, § 12, cost lie against the crown. (1860) 23 & 24 Vict. c. 34 § 12;
ROBERTSON, supra at 398, 616.
HeinOnline  -- 36 Yale L. J. 24 1926-1927
GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY IN TORT 25
not rightfully held by him." There were a variety of writs, to
deliver (liberes) to restore (restitz;v.), not to meddle further
(te de cetero non internittas), to cause to have seisin (habcre
facias seisinam) designed to serve special purposes. 1  They all
evidence the doctrine that the king was not privileged to do
wrong.
If the ordinary procedure for securing justice proved ineffec-
tive, extraordinary or exceptional remedies were provided. If
local officials or the exchequer failed to return or make offset
or assignment for excess revenues collected, redress would have
to be sought in chancery. This relief might be obtained with-
out or with application to the king in council.- Applications
to the king and council were made verbally or in writing.
Hence the origin of the petition. The king might on his own
initiative direct the chancery to issue a writ for an investiga-
tion or inquisition by the proper department or officer. The
petitions were presented at the meetings of the parliaments and
were appropri~itely endorsed; toward the end of Edward's
reign, in the early part of the fourteenth century, it seems that
the forms of petition became fairly rigid.-- The practice de-
veloped, by ordinance, of submitting petitions directly to the
exchequer, if the complaint affected that branch, or to the chan-
cellor, and the king was to be disturbed only if the petition
could not be dealt with by those officers without the aid of the
king and council. In fact, all the petitions had to follow the
prescribed channel. Petitions were divided into those of grace
and of right, the latter believed to involve a claim founded upon
the violation of some legal right. The king was thus regarded
as subject to the rules of law, notwithstanding the exceptional
nature of the proceeding for redress. Receivers of petitions
were appointed, according to four geographical areas, Scotland,
Gascony, Ireland and Guernsey.74 Their duty it was, with the
aid of the chancellor and the treasurer, to act as an examining
committee and to answer such petitions as they could. Special
committees might also be appointed when the regular commit-
70 a Bl. Comm. *257. Petitions of right were usually brought for some
grievance which would have been the subject of a real action if brought
against a private person. HOLDswoRTH, The History of Rcmcdics Against the
Crown (1922) 38 L. Q. REV. 142; 9 HoLDSWoRTH, op. cit. supra note 27, at 7.
71 See illustrations of these writs in EHRLICH, op. cit. supra note 47, at
62.
722 F=uTA, SEu Connm=nAnrus Junis ANGLIC.Nr (London, Selden ed.
1647) 74.
7 See the various forms of words used in petitions, EHRLiCH, op. cit. svpra
note 47, at 84.
74 ATL4XTLAND, DIEIOMADA DE PARLIA-MENTO (Rolls Series, 1305) 0-4,
cited by EMHICE, op. cit. supra note 47, at 100; 1 Rotnli Parliaincntolnm,
21t et petitiones, et placita in parliamzento tcizpo&re R. I, v. 1, No. 5 (6
Edw. I, 1278).
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tees were overburdened. They would reserve for parliament
and the king and council only such petitions as could not be acted
upon by the committees or the departments, to whom by en-
dorsement the petition was usually referred for investigation
and decision. The receivers were often members of the king's
council. In later reigns, masters in chancery and justices and
exchequer remembrancers were among the members of examin-
ing committees or triers, as they were later called. The king
and council might also refer petitions to be tried by departments
or officials having special knowledge or jurisdiction of the sub-
ject matter.75
The responsibility of officials for injuries inflicted by them
was gradually asserted, in the case of minor officials, by waiver
of the king's privilege to cover them with his royal protection;
if he did assume responsibility, as in the case of superior offi-
cials, the relief by petition was alone available to the injured
subject.
In the reigns of Edward II and Edward III no great change
in underlying notions occurred. But political conditions ef-
fected institutional modifications. With the growth of the idea
of national consciousness, of "the commonalty of the realm of
England, '76 there came also the institutionalization of the king-
ship and an enlargement of its privileges and prerogatives.
While it was still true that the king was not privileged to do
wrong, and more detailed procedure was provided for bringing
into issue and determination'allegations of wrongdoing perpe-
trated in the king's name, there is also to be noted a greater
exercise "of power by the king, both in the exchequer, in chan-
cery and in parliament, to prevent any encroachment beyond
that which he sanctioned. There was still the notion, analogous
to that of Bracton's day, that his subjects, now bound by their
oath to the crown rather than to the person of the king, were
under a duty in case of abuse to bring him back to the exercise
of his proper powers, a notion which cost Edward II his life.
The king's oath involved a constitutional limitation. Yet, con-
trary to present-day views, the king's illegal order protected
his officials from suit,77 a rule thus involving the king's assump-
tion of responsibility, but inconsistent with any notion of sover-
eign immunity. He might waive his royal privilege and thus
subject his officers to suit, yet only before such courts as he
designated, either the exchequer or special courts. It might
have been preferable to continue to regard official acts as royal
75 The different methods of disposition of petitions are discussed by
EHRLiCH, op. cit. supra note 47, at 101 et seq.
76 2 Rotuli Parliamentoram 128, No. 9 (15 Edw. III, 1341).
7 7 Brooke, LA GRAuNDE ABRMGMENT (London, 1576) tit. Faux Imprison-
ment 9; EHRLICH, op. cit. supra note 47, at 129, 200.
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acts, and accord the injured subject relief against the crown, a
practice which would have been more efficient and more just
to all parties concerned. The development in England, how-
ever, was the other way-though the distortion of historical
maxims and theories-to relieve the king from responsibility
for official acts and make the official personally responsible be-
fore what might be called administrative courts, a practice
common to much of continental Europe down to the prezent
time, and then before the ordinary courts.
In the fourteenth century there was as yet no notion that the
king was not responsible for wrongs done his subjects or that
he was infallible. On the contrary, the possibility of his doing
wrong was freely admitted and an elaborate procedure devised
by which the injured subject could invoke relief. The fact that
this method of relief was often cumbersome, that it required
the king's permission and was surrounded by various safe-
guards against undue royal burden, does not detract, it is be-
lieved, from its essentially legal nature. While it is true that
the petition might be refused, thus giving it the color of a
supplication for grace, the fact seems to be that petitions were
not rejected or dismissed except for strictly legal reasons. Cus-
tom had enjoined upon the king the rule of law that a petition
founded upon the violation of what practice had developed and
characterized as a legal or vested right, should not go unre-
dressed. It would seem that a definition of law which denom-
inates such claims as legal does not offend good usage, though
the Austinians may find it lacking in objective enforceability.
So would they the decisions of the United States Court of Claims
or of the French Conseil d'Etat.
A proclamation made in the parliament of 1341 announced
that every one who felt aggrieved by the king or his ministers
or by others should institute a petition and he would have his
remedy.8 In a few cases the king's illegal act was deemed
void, and the new idea developed that illegal royal writs might
be disobeyed.9 Yet on the whole this was exceptional, and for
the most part his illegal acts were voidable only, in the methods
he prescribed. The limitations upon responsibility and burden
were naturally construed in his favor, not only because the jus-
tices were appointed by him but because of the growth of the
prerogative 0 But the prerogative itself was deemed to be in
the interests of the realm and people.
78 2 Rotuli Parliamentonmi 127, No. 5 (15 Edw7. III, 1341); EnLiCa, op.
cit. supra note 47, at 128.
S91 Rotuli Parliamenton a 285, No. 32 (5 Edw. II, 1312); Ordinance of
1311, cited by EHicH, op. cit. szvpra note 47, at 12S-129, 131.
8 0 Dr. Ehrlich cites the rule that the king was always to be concidered
a bonae fidae possessor and hence never a disseizor. This led in 1485 to
the conclusion of the justices and sergeants in chancery that "the King
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Claims against the king had become common, and a clear dis-
tinction was recognized between petitions by way of grace and
petitions by way of right, that is, founded upon the violation of
a vested right of the subject.8 The procedure of the exche-
quer and of the chancery was regulated in great detail; both be-
came courts trying cases in regular course. The more limited
jurisdiction was that of the exchequer; if they refused to "do
right," application for a writ would lie to the chancery. The
chancery remained the office for ordinary grievances ;12 one ap-
plied for a writ, which the chancery in its discretion might
issue, or else require the applicant to institute a petition to the
king. The writ was usually issued where the claim involved a
question of land titles and after issue joined, might be sent to
the king's bench for trial. Damages, however, could not be
awarded by the chancery. A king's attorney safeguarded the
king's interests. By ordinances, particularly one of 1349, the
jurisdiction of the chancery was greatly enlarged,3 so that many
complaints formerly directed to the king by petition could now
be brought in chancery. This greatly limited the number of
petitions and the relative importance of the petition practice.
The practice on petitions as inaugurated by Edward I re-
mained in principle unchanged. Under the ordinance of 1349,
petitions could be brought both inside and outside of the parlia-
ments. In the case of petitions outside parliament, it was pro-
vided that the chancellor and the keeper of the privy seal should
receive and examine them and send to the king, with their ad-
could not be said to have committed a 'tort.'" EHRLICH, op. cit. supra note
47, at 139 citing Y. B. I Edw. V, p. 8, note 13. Theretofore it had been ar-
gued that the king could commit a tort just like any other person. Y. B. 35
Hen. VI, 61. The various meanings attached to the limitation coram rege
terminari debet placitum quod ipsum tangit are described at length by
EHRLICH, op. cit. supra note 47, at 150 et seq. A description of the many
advantages enjoyed by the king and not by the claimant on petition of
right, advantages which made the proceeding both cumbersome and difficult,
will be found in Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 70, at 156-158. Hence the
growth of other remedies like traverse and the monstrance de droit. Ibid.
160-161.81 In 1330, the king and council removed all the sheriffs of England and
agreed to appoint judges to inquire into and determine cases of abuse of
power by sheriffs, coroners, constables, bailiffs, hundreders and other officers,
since the accession of Edward II. 2 Rotuli Parliamentorum 60, No. 2 (4
Edw. III, 1330) ; EHRLICH, op. cit. supra note 47, at 158. See infra note 84
as to the growing cleavage between a petition for grace and a petition of
right. On the conception of vested right, see J. Walter Jones, Acquired and
Guaranteed Rights, CAMBRMGE LEGAL ESSAYS (Cambridge, 1926) 223.
82 There was a standing formula endorsed on many parliamentary peti-
tions: "Let every one who feels aggrieved come to t:e chancery and right
will be done to him." EHRLICH, op. cit. supra note 47, at 170.
s3 EHRLICH, op. cit. supra, note 47, at 174, citing 3 Rymer, Foedera
(London, 1703) 181; Calendar of Close Rolls, 22 Edw. III, 615.
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vice, only those which they could not expedite rcgc ibconsidta.
The petition would then come back with the king's endorse-
ment of his desires in the matter. Petitions of right, as dis-
tinguished from those of grace, might complain against private
parties, such as judges, juries, etc. or against the king or his
officials, seeking restitution of real property, damages, allow-
ances or an equivalent." The procedure on private petitions in
parliament somewhat modified certain of the details established
by Edward 1,85 notably with respect to the method of receiving
and trying petitions for redress. Auditors appointed by parlia-
ment either decided the case or routed it to the proper depart-
ment or sent it to the king or to the council for report to the
king. Petitions, if not rejected, would be disposed of either (1)
by decision, before the council or before the parliament; (2) by
a hypothetical decision of the auditors, council or king, and the
chancery or exchequer or designated official directed to deter-
mine the truth of the allegation; (3) by an adjournment to let
courts or officials supply necessary evidence; or (4) by trans-
mission to the courts, king's bench, chancery or exchequer or
to a designated official or commission, with an order to "do
right."
.Mention should also be made of two statutes of 1360 and 1362
which, in certain proceedings approximating real actions, en-
abled the subject to recover land wrongfully seized or held by
the king more speedily than by the dilatory petition of right.
These statutes enabled the subject to traverse the king's alleged
title, acquired or held by office found or, by confession and
avoidance, to show his own right-the origin of the remedy of
nonstrans de droitG lany of the special advantages enjoyed
by the king in the procedure on petition of right were not claim-
able in traverse or vzonst,'ans de droit. These remedies were,
8- Y. B. 24 Edw. III, f. 24, Residuum de tcrmino piaschal, 42; EurO cH,
op. cit. supra note 47, at 118-123, 186. Ehrlich points out at page 1S7,
note 15, that the distinction between the petition of grace and the petition
of right is clear and that one had nothing to do with the other. See Holds-
worth, op. cit. supra note 70, at 148, who says that the distinction had not
clearly emerged much before the end of the fifteenth century. At page 293
he expresses the opinion that the petition of right had never been com-
pletely differentiated from other petitions "of grace' and thus e plains
its flexibility. Cf. W. CLODE, PETrrIoN OF RIGHT (London, 13S7) 1G-17; 2
ANSoN, LAW Am CUSTOM OF THE CONSTrruTIoN (Oxford, Od ed. 1397) 00.
85 EMLICH, op. cit. supra note 47 at 189, note 6.
S6 STAUNFORD, op. cit. supra note 51, at 60 et seq. 70 b, 71 a; see The
Sadlers' Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 1012 (1588); Lord Somers in The Bankers Case,
14 State Trials 77-79 (1692) ; Holdsworth, op. cit. supr& note 70, at 158-16!,
161-164; 9 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. s.pra note 27, at 24 et scq. The remedy
of zonstrans de droit was further extended by an Act of (1543) 2 & 3
Edw. VI, c. S. See The Sadlers' Case, supra. Like the real actions gener-
ally, these special proceedings tended to drop out of use in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries.
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therefore, availed of by claimants whenever possible."7 In the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they all but superseded the
petition of right, which is mentioned only rarely; 81 but as these
remedies were very special and as the petition of right was a
general remedy flexible in application, the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries witnessed a vigorous revival of the petition of
right.
It appears also that the petition of right, whose distinctive
character it was that the law applicable was the same as that
applied in litigation between subjects, did not extend to ordi-
nary breaches of contract in England until 1874. But this was
largely because alternative remedies were provided and because
the law of contract had not yet been worked out fully. For
omission to pay an annuity, regarded as a proceeding to recover
an incorporeal thing, a petition lay ;"" also for compensation for
failure to warrant the title of the king's grantee, for the grant
of a rent, or to recover a franchise. In the case of ordinary
money claims, a petition for a writ of liberate ordering the ex-
chequer to pay or to hear the claim-a remedy used until 1844
--was more expeditious than the usual petition of right 0  Nor
had the modern distinctions between tort and contract been
adequately developed. So that while the equivalent of so-called
real actions or cases involving the law of property constituted
the principal subject-matter of the petition of right, it was by
no means so limited, when the grievances redressed, in the light
of modern legal classification, are considered. Injuries to
property, as in trespass on land by digging trenches,"' were
thus not considered in 1843 and 1864 precedents for the asser-
tion that a petition of right lay for a tort.9 2 In fact we are as-
sured by Holdsworth that by the end of the fifteenth century
it was coming to be recognized that the king could not be sued
for a tort and also, contrary to the earlier law, that the king's
officer or agent was alone liable-a rule which in the sixteenth
873 B1. Comm. *260.
88 3 COKE, INSTITUTES* 216 mentions a petition of right in 1583. Holds-
worth says that there appear to be no instances of petitions in the reports
of the seventeenth century. Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 70, at 163.
89 Case in 18 Edw. I cited by Lord Somers in The Bankers Case, supra
note 86, at 82. Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 70, at 152, 155; 9 HOLDS-
WORTH, op cit. supra note 27, at 18, 21.
90 CLODE, op. cit. supra note 84, at 20-22; Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note
70, at 155; 9 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 27, at 21.
9'Robert de Clifton's Case, 1 Rotuli Parliamentorum 416, No. 3 (18
Edw. II, 1325); Gerveis de Clifton's Case, Y. B. 22 Edw. III, Pasch. pl.
12 (1349) discussed by EHRLICH, op. cit. supra note 47, at 123-126, 264.
02 Viscount Canterbury v. The Queen, 12 L. J. Ch. (n. s.) 281 (1843);
9bobin v. The Queen, 16 C. B. N. S. 309 (1864) where Clifton's case was
explained as a misuser or wrongful assertion of an easement which had
caused damage, i.e. the subject of what might have been a real action.
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century developed into the modern theory that the king could
do no wrong, in the sense that he was incapable of doing
wrong' 3 Certainly such a notion was directly contrary to the
cultural tradition and constituted a perversion of older views
of the king's responsibility. It is probably to be associated
with the gTowth of the prerogative, the strengthening of the
kingship, the ideas of divine right and of the absolute sovereign.
Just when the transition in meaning occurred it is hard to
say. Possibly it was during the Tudor despotism when much
nonsense9. about the immaculate king of trancendental preroga-
tives and goodness was purveyed. Then came the effort to
idealize these characteristics and to create in one and the same
person a conceptual king of superhuman gifts and privileges
and a natural man. This dual personality, further confused
by Coke's erection of the crown into a corporation sole and by
the reinvigorated dogma of divine right, has resulted in that
amazing array of contradictions associated with the British
state, in which the institutional and the personal are now
united, now disunited, so that British lawyers find it difficult
to distinguish or visualize such conceptions as state, crown,
government, or public.2 At all events, the personification of
the English governing authority and power, though tempered in
practice by many devices such as ministerial responsibility and
judicial independence, has kept alive and fruitful the theological
and legal creed associated with kings who do not die, who are
never under age, who do no wrong and who think no wrong.
Coke remarked that "it is a maxim of the law that the king
can do no wrong." 0" Blackstone derived the maxim from the
93 3OLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 27, at 311; Y. B. 1 Hen. VII, Mich.
pl. 5 per Hussey, C. J. Holdsworth, op. cit. szipra note 70, at 154; 9
HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. sztpra note 27, at 20. But the tort of disseisin or dis-
possession could always be redressed by petition of right, whether the land
was in the hands of the king or of a grantee. Staunford, op. cit. -zpra
note 51, f. 74 b. So a petition lay for a chattel interest in land (Broolhe,
op. cit. supra note 77, tit. Peticion, pl. 2) and probably for chattels per-
sonal. Staunford, supra at f. 75 b, 76 a; contra, Hussey, C. J. in Y. B. 1
Hen. VII, Mich. pl. 3, cited by Holdsworth, op. cit. sztpra note 70, at 154;
9 HOLDSWoRTH, op. cit. szpra note 27, at 20.
q4 See Maitland's characterization of Plowden's reverential metaphor3 as
"metaphysiological nonsense." 3 MIL",qD, CoLLEcED Prms (1911) 2149.
9 Ibid. 244 et seq; Laski, The Responsibility of the State in Eaglad
(1919) 32 HA.v. L. REV. 447; LUCAS, THE CoRoETS NATurn o E:.;GLSH
SOVEREIGNTY (London, 1911) 59 et seq.
9' 1 CORE, INSTITUTES *73, 2 ibid. *1S7, *207, 0631. So 1 HLE, PLESs
OF THE CROWN (Dublin, 1778) 43, shows that although the law controls
the king's act sufficiently to determine that it may be "unlawful," never-
theless the king cannot be sued nor does it afford protection to the un-
lawfully commanded officer. "It is regularly true, that the law presumes
the King will do no wrong, neither indeed can do any wrong; and there-
fore, if the King command an unlawful act to be done, the offense of the
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royal prerogative which he defines as "that special preeminence
which the King hath over and above all other persons, and out
of the course of the common law, in right of his royal dignity,"
and from the attribution of "absolute perfection" with which
the law clothed the sovereign.97 Hence his infallibility. But
it is probable that this was only a result of his then admitted
non-suability. Bacon concludes that there is no remedy because
there is no right.98 Blackstone furnishes a more analytical rea-
son when he says that the evidence of legal "right" is found
in the existence of a legal remedy, and the law presumes no
injury where it has provided no remedy.'" This is the orthodox
Austinian test of a legal right and of the existence of "legal"
relations; while observing that it is not the only acceptable de-
finition of law and that it is exceedingly narrow in its con-
ception, it may nevertheless be accepted ex hypothesi as a char-
acterization of the concept "legal" and "law." It is followed
by all the Austinians and by Mr. Justice Holmes in his view" that
there can be no "tort" by the state when there is no remedy
against the state. This has been compared to the argument
that there can be no disease for which medical science has no
cure.
The continental jurists, who on the whole have not been will-
ing to permit these sterile concepts to defeat what seemed to
them elementary demands of justice and who did not permit
themselves to be fettered by feudal fictions of the prerogative-
which is said, ironically, to have been created for the benefit
of the people and may not'be exerted to their prejudice 2-have
instrument is not thereby indemnified; for, though the King is not under
the coercive power of the law, yet in many cases his commands are under
the directive power of the law, which consequently makes the act itself
invalid, if unlawful, and so renders the instrument of the execution there-
of obnoxious to the punishment of the law." Hale cites 1 STAUNFORD, PLEAS
OF THE CROWN (London 1560) 102 b. See also 2 COKE, op. cit. supra at *186.
97 1 BL. CoMiAi. *239, *241, *'245. Yet Blackstone at the same time notes
the more historically correct view of the king's legal position when he
adds: Conversely, the king's prerogative "extends not to do any injury;
it is created for the benefit of the people, and therefore can not be exerted
to their prejudice." 1 ibid. 246; 3 ibid. 255. See also PLOWDEN, COMMEN-
TARIES (London, 1779) 246: "for the King cannot do any wrong, nor will his
prerogative be any warrant to him to do an injury to another." See also
ibid. 487.
98 BACON, ABRIDGEMENT (Dublin, 1786) tit. Actions (B).
99 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. supra note 97, at *246, note 2. There is no
"suit or action," "because no court can have jurisdiction over him, for all
jurisdiction implies superiority of power" and he "owes no kind of sub-
jection" to potentate or any other authority. Ibid. *241-2.
2 The Western Maid, supra note 46, at 433, 42 Sup. Ct. at 161.
2 Nichols v. Nichols, Plowden, 477, 487 (C. B. 1576). The argument
that the prerogative cannot be exerted to the prejudice of the subject, be-
cause created for his benefit, is characterized in ALLEN, THE RISE AND
HeinOnline  -- 36 Yale L. J. 32 1926-1927
GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY IN TORT 33
very readily admitted that the State, the organized group, can
commit injuries, and have therefore approved recoveries against
the State, permitted by courts and enlarged by legislation, with-
out indulgence in metaphysical speculations and antiquated
anachronisms. Blackstone speaks of the sovereign as incapable
of thinking wrong, or meaning to do an improper act, and there-
fore, of authorizing a "wrong" 3-conceptions unlmown to
Bracton's time. Nor is there any adequate explanation for
the easy transition of the personal prerogative of the ing to
the "sovereign" and later to the "crowm." Even more extra-
ordinary is its extension to the American state or people, which
have hardly laid claim to the enjoyment of the royal prerog-
ative. Writers on the prerogative emphasize its per.onal
character, and Chitty remarks- that "the inviolability of the
King is essential to the existence of his powers as supreme
magistrate; and therefore his person is sacred." Out of his
alleged incapability of acting "unlawfully or improperly," com-
bined with his non-suablity, Chitty derived "the legal apothegm1
that the King can do no wrong."
It must be admitted that for centuries the petition of right
GROWTH OF THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE IN ENGLAND (London, 1849) 32, as
equivalent to the assertion that "an army which has been raised in de-
fence of the liberties of a country, cannot be used for their destruction."
3 2 BLACKSTON.E, op. cit. supra note 97, at 246. Some of the later cases
go beyond Blackstone in this deductive reasoning. For example, in Lord
Canterbury v. The Queen, 12 L. J. Ch. 281 (1S43), it is argued that it is
admitted that for personal negligence of the sovereign a suit cannot be
maintained. If the master is liable for the acts of a servant on the theory
qud facit per aliur facit per se this cannot apply to the sovereign, who
cannot be required to answer for his personal acts. If such responsibility
is based on the master's misconduct in selecting or retaining a carele-s
servant, that likewise could not apply to the sovereign, to whom negli-
gence or misconduct cannot be imputed. Thus, any theory of rczpondcat
superior seems inapplicable to the sovereign, by judicial fiat. So in Tobin
v. The Queen, 16 C. B. N. S. 310 (1S46): "That which the Sovereign
does personally, the law presumes will not be wrong; that which the Sov-
ereign does by command to his servants cannot be a wrong in the Sover-
eign, because if the command be unlawful it is in law no command," on
which ground it seems to the court quite proper to hold the luclezs ser-
vant personally responsible. The reasoning in Feather v. The Queen, 6
B. & S. 257 (1865) is equally sententious: "For from the ma:dm that
the King can do no wrong it follows, as a necessary consequence, that the
King cannot allow wrong to be done; for to authorize a wrong to be done
is to do a wrong; and as the wrongful act done becomes in law the act
of those who authorize it to be done, it follows that the petition of right
which complains of a tortious or wrongful act by the Crown or by ser-
vants of the Crown discloses no right to redress, for as in law no such
wrong can be done no such right can arise . . . It is surprising that
this petitio principii should have been accepted as a legal explanation as
late as the nineteenth century.
4CHnrrT , THE LAw OF THE PREROGATIV OF THE C 0WN (London, 1820)
5; Allen, op. cit. supra note 2, at 25, 31.
HeinOnline  -- 36 Yale L. J. 33 1926-1927
YALE LAW JOURNAL
lay for a disseisin by the king to recover a chattel wrongfully
taken by the crown,5 and for numerous other torts. In fact
the modern rule as now applied is, as Holdsworth points out,
a direct result of a misconception of the modern basis of the
employer's liability for the torts of his servant.
The transition from medieval to modern law occurred in the
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. It was after the
Restoration, 1661, that the modern relations between law and
equity developed; that the incidents of tenure, the many real
actions and the technical rules of land law became obsolete, and
that the law of contract, with the growth of commerce, assumes
a new importance. The relief of the subject against the crown
was necessarily affected by these developments and, as the idea
still prevailed that the subject was entitled to the same redress
against the crown as he had against a fellow-subject, new fields
of application for such relief were readily developed.0
In 1668, equitable relief was granted the subject against the
crown in the broadened Court of Exchequer.7 This became a
precedent for equitable relief in any court having jurisdiction,
without a petition of right, although it is now often granted
under the Petition of Right Act, 1860.8 The Bankers' Case
(1692)" also led to important developments. The bankers, who
had been ruined by the failure of Charles II to repay loans,
presented a petition to the barons of the Exchequer for pay-
ment. The petition was held proper by the Court of Exchequer.
This was reversed by Lord Somers who held that a petition
of right should have been brought, but the House of Lords re-
instated the. decision of the Court of Exchequer, so that the
creditor of the crown has alternative remedies, a writ of liberate
under the old practice, petition to the exchequer for relief, a
petition of right, and possibly monstrance de droit.
5 Y. B. 34 Hen. VI, pl. 18 (1463) per Danby, J. FITZHERBERT, ABniIDaE-
MENT (London, 1577) tit. Peticion, pl. 8; Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note
70, at 155, note 1.
6 For this development, see Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 70, at 280;
9 HOLDSWoRTH, op. cit. supra note 27, at 29.
7 Pawlett v. The Attorney General, Hardres, 465 (Ex. 1668); Holds-
worth, op. cit. supra note 70, at 281; 9 HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. supra note
27, at 31. See also Reeve v. The Attorney General, 2 Atkyns *223 (Ch.
1741). That Exchequer was deemed the only court which could give re-
lief against the king, see 3 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. supra note 97, at *428.
8 CLODE, op. cit. supra note 84, at 146 et seq; Holdsworth, op. cit. supra
note 70, at 282; 9 HOLDSwoRTH, op. cit. supra note 27, at 31.
9 Supra, note 86. The exhaustive decision of the House of Lords is ana-
lyzed at length by Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 70, at 283 et seq; 9
HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. supra note 27, at 32 et seq., for the various views
expressed led to the development of the law of the petition of right in
the nineteenth century.
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The increasing activity of the State, and reforms in fiscl
administration, with the resultant obsolescence of the suit for
a writ of liberate0 or a petition to the exchequer, made it neces-
sary in the nineteenth century to devise modernized methods
for enforcing claims against the State. The Petition of Right
Act, 1860, revised the existing procedure while leaving the
theory and principle unaffected; yet the circumstances under
which the petition properly lay were left to the courts to de-
clare.11 Several judges emphasized that the petition should pro-
vide a remedy in all cases where the subject would have a rem-
edy were the defendant a private individual.12  The Baak~c,,-'
Case had indicated that the petition of right would lie for
breach of contract; and while this was assumed in numerous
cases in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it was not
squarely held until the case of Thomas v. The Qzwcni (1874).-
It lay from time immemorial for the recovery of property, real
and personal, a class of cases, as such, still generally classified
in the United States as torts. Holdsworth maintains that thera
is ample authority, medieval and modern, for its extension to
the recovery of compensation or damages for conversion24
In view of the fact that the crown is expected to accord a
remedy, through the procedure by petition of right, whenever
a private defendant would be held liable at common lair or
equity, 5 it seems unfortunate that a historical misconception
should have led to a departure from this principle in matters of
tort. The maxim "The king can do no wrong," was perverted
from its historical meaning that he was not privileged to do
wrong into the modern meaning that he was incapable of doing
wrong. But even in this respect there was much inconsistency.
10 CLODE, Op. cit. supra note 84, at 125.
" The development of the practice and the arguments for the liberal anti
restrictive theory and the intermediate theory finally adopted by the courts
is set out in Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 70, at 290 ct -cq; 9 HOLs-
WORTH, op. cit. supra note 27, at 39 et seq.
12Park% B., in Baron de Bode v. The Queen, 13 Q. B. 3G4, 387 (134S);
Lord Denman, same case, 8 Q. B. 208, 237 (1845); Cockburn, C. J. in Fa-
ther v. The Queen, supra note 3.
3L. R. 10 Q. B. 31 (1874), where the earlier cases are mentioned (p.
43). CLODE, op. cit. supra note 34, at 120 et scq. maintains that Bac:-
burn, J. was not justified in relying upon the views of Lord Holt and
Lord Somers for the decision in Thomas v. The Queen.
1 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 70, at 293, citing Y. B. mupra note 5;
STAUNFORD, op. cit. supra note 96, at 75b, 76a. Trover as late as 1776 wzu
practically an action for the recovery of property. Hambly v. Trott, 1
Cowp. 372, 374 (K. B. 1776). In Feather v. The Queen, snpra note 0, at
294, Cockburn, C. J. remarked that "the only cases in which the pctition
of right" lay are "where the lands or goods or money of the subject have
found their way into the possession of the Crown" and "restitution" or
"compensation in money" in lieu of restitution, is sought.
1 'See Cockburn, C. J. in Feather v. The Queen, -zpra note 3, at 295.
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To this day, wrongful injuries to or takings of property, of the
type formerly redressed through real actions, are deemed proper
subjects for a petition of right, though manifestly torts with re-
spect to property. Nor is it clear why "wrong" should have
been translated into "tort"; certainly breach of contract and
the wrongful seizure of property are as much wrongs as any
pure tort. No such conceptions prevailed on the continent,
where they were more troubled by the technical difficulty,
founded on old legal theories, of making a corporation liable
in tort, and in determining the distinction between corporate
and governmental acts. Nor did the English courts rely upon
Hobbes and Bodin, as does the United States Supreme Court,
to assert that the king or crown, as the maker of the law, was
above the law, manifestly untrue in England and no less un-
true of the Executive in the United States. Nor is the king
any longer the State, as Louis XIV claimed.
Probably the explanation for the English solecism, perhaps
destined soon to disappear by legislation, is that a tortious act
of the king personally had never been sued for, and that the
reason for making the employer liable for the acts of the ser-
vant, qui facit per aliur facit per se, was not deemed applicable
to the king. His servants, after the seventeenth century, could
be personally sued in tort. For some reason it was said that
the king could not authorize a tort, though it was obvious that
he and his ministers often did, notably by illegal orders. The
law, however, presumed that the king had not authorized a
wrong and that the officer had personally willed it-two fictions
resulting in injustice with respect to all parties concerned,
State, officer and victim. The rule of respondeat superior in
employers' liability has been justified in the course of the nine-
teenth century on numerous grounds- (a) imputation of lia-
bility resting on employer's assumed authority, in acting
tlrough an agent, to commit the tort; (b) liability due to en-
hanced range of activity achieved through agents-the risk of
the enterprise; (c) employer's responsibility for the selection
and supervision of competent employees; and (d) an enlightened
view of public policy in the distribution of burdens and losses.
In the nineteenth century the first and the third grounds were
most commonly advanced in justification of the employer's lia-
bility, and both these were held inapplicable to the sovereign. '
16 Lord Canterbury v. The Queen, supra note 3, by Lord Lyndhurst, who
argued that as the sovereign could not be made responsible for his per-
sonal torts, he could not be responsible for those of his agents on the
theory qui facit per alium facit per se. Nor could misconduct or negli-
gence in selecting or retaining a careless servant be attributed to the sov-
ereign. See also Tobin v. The Queen, supra note 3, at 310; Feather
v. The Queen, supra note 3, at 295; Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 70, at
294; Morgan, Introduction to ROBISoN, op. cit. supra note 45, at xxit.
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Had the modern view of the basis of employer's liability pre-
vailed when these cases arose to mould the law, possibly a dif-
ferent result would have been reached. At all events none of
the grounds advanced for the sovereign immunity, historicl or
theoretical, can today command serious respect or be regarded
as convincing. This is partly acknowledged by the enlargement
of the scope of the petition of right in many colonies so as to
cover tort cases17 and by a recent decision in the House of Lords
holding that a petition of right would lie to enforce a statutory
duty to pay compensation arising out of implied contract. '
Holdsworth properly points the inquiry: if it lies for a statutory
duty, why not for a duty imposed by common law?19 He adds:
"To hold that the Crown is liable for the torts of its servants,
on the same principle as an ordinary employer, would infringe
the maxim that the King can do no wrong as much and a3
little as to hold the Crown liable for a disseisin or a nuisance
or an encroachment on the subject's property."
The fact is that the unitary character of the sovereign in
England, the refusal since Coke's time to see in the king a dual
personality, personal and political and the refusal to regard the
crown as a corporation, have brought innumerable anomalies
in the law governing remedies against the crown. The im-
putation to the State in England of the infallibility of the per-
sonal king, though without warrant in history or logic, can pos-
sibly be explained on the evolutionary ground that the king
did once dispense justice in person and chose his own servants.
Even this shadow of justification for an archaic rule is inap-
plicable in the United States, where it nevertheless flourishes
and finds occasional support.2"  Hardly a modern publicist or
17 Farnell v. Bowman, 12 App. Cas. 643, at 649 (P. C. 18S7). In Aus-
tralia by section 56 of the Judiciary Act the crown is liable in tort for
wrongful acts of officers, like an ordinary employer. Baume v. Common-
wealth, 4 Comm. L. R. 97 (1906); Strachan v. Commonwealth, 4 Comm.
L. R. 455 (1906). See also Senate bill 1912, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., passed
by the House June 10, 1926.
Is Atty. Gen. v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel [1920] A. C. 503. L. Scott,
and L. A. HILDESLEY, THE CASE OF REQUISITION (O.fiord, 1920) 114 et ccq.
19 Holdsworth, op. cit. s2tpra note 70, at 295; 9 HOLDSITorTH, op. elt.
svpra note 27, at 44. An increasing number of statutes in England and
America, either by authorizing suits against government departments or
officers or by permitting suits against the State in specific eazes, evi-
dences the growing conviction that the State's responsibility for the torts
of its agents should no longer be evaded. See Ministry of Transport
Act (1919) 9 & 10 Geo. V, c. 50, § 26. For limited United States federal
statutes, see infra note 27.
20 See 1 BURGESS, POLrIICAL SCIENCE AND CONSTITuTIoxAL LAW (Boston,
1891) 57, who says, "we must hold to the principle that the state can do
no wrong." The argument runs: The "State is the King," (l'Etat c'est
moi) therefore the State is not responsible for the torts of its employees,
for to impute liability in tort to the State would be to impute tort to the
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student of the subject can now be found, however, who does
not agree with Maitland's well-known observation: ".
it is a wholesome sight to see 'the Crown' sued and answering
for its torts." 21
Inasmuch as the English king was a personal ruler and the
fountain of justice it was perhaps not unnatural that he should
be regarded as exempt from the jurisdiction of any court, ex-
cept in the manner and to the extent that he consented to sub-
mit. It is said that this rule, which constituted a part of the
common law, was introduced into the United States after Ameri-
can independence, notwithstanding that the sovereign here has
from the beginning been separated from the government and
that the latter has been deemed merely the agent of the sov-
ereign. But in the early days of the nation the Supreme Court
in Chisholm v. Georgia22 concluded that the doctrine of State
immunity from suit was characteristic of autocracy and incon-
sistent with popular sovereignty. The eleventh amendment,
however, though confined to the federal courts, restored the
ancient doctrine to full .effect, and the courts, since Cohens V.
Virgini ,23 have accepted it as immutable, regardless of its his.
torical origin in an autocratic conception of a personal sov-
ereign, of the diametrically opposed democratic theory of the
American commonwealth and of the fact that a great part of
the rest of the civilized world has denied its validity. Indeed
it is regarded by our courts as a matter of simple logic, ex-
pressed as follows by Mr. Justice Holmes, an extreme Austin-
ian:
"A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority
that makes the law on which the right depends." 24 And, comes
the logical conclusion, as he is exempt-from suit, therefore he
can do no wrong. "The United States has not consented to
be sued for torts, and therefore it cannot be said that in a legal
sense the United States has been guilty of a tort." 21
the King who "can do no wrong." See Morgan, Introduction to ROBINSON,
op. cit. supra note 45, at LIV. See also Senator King in CoNa. REc. March
15, 1926. p. 5389, and letter of Attorney General Sargent, in CONG. REC.
March 16, 1926, p. 5488.
21 3 MAITLAND, COLLECTED PAPERS (Cambridge, 1911) 263. See also Mor-
gan, Introduction to ROBINSON, op. cit. supra note 45, at lxxxiii.
22 2 Dall. 419 (U. S. 1793).
23 6 Wheat. 264, 382 (U. S. 1821).
24 Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, supra note 46, at 353. See the historical
attack upon this theory by John M. Zane, A Legal Heresy (1919) 13 ILL.
L. RENV. 431. See also subsequent articles of this series.
25 The Western Maid, supra note 46, at 433. Justice Holmes adds:
"Legal obligations that exist but cannot be enforced are ghosts that are
HeinOnline  -- 36 Yale L. J. 38 1926-1927
GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY IN TORT 09
The substitution of popular for kingly sovereignty has thus
effected no change in the theory of suability or responsibility,
and notwithstanding the difference betwreen State and govern-
ment, principal and agent, and the supposed control of the
"rule of law" and constitutional limitations, the sovereignty
of the people becomes in practical operation the sovereignty of
the government.2- , Nor was the petition of right to the Execu-
tive applicable in the United States, because historically the
Executive is not the sovereign. The injured individual, in prin-
ciple and, in many states of the United States, in practice, is
thus left, apart from his often useless right of action against
a subordinate officer, to his privilege to petition the legislature,
the residuary of the public power, for relief. In the federal
government, his helplessness has been tempered by several
statutes, such as the act establishing the Court of Claims, by
which the federal Congress permitted suit in contract, and by
recent Acts permitting suits in admiralty for tort without limit-
ation of liability, and permitting general claims in tort up to
$1000 to be heard by the executive departments."-  These
measures and their legal effect have been discussed in a pre-
vious article. Though a comprehensive tort bill passed the
House of Representatives, June 10, 1926, in principle it still re-
mains t-ue that the federal government and practically all the
states, deny responsibility for the torts of their officers and em-
ployees. Our present interest is to examine the theories sus-
taining this conclusion, and at this point, the effect of the theory
that the king can do no wrong.
It is not open to doubt that notwithstanding the denial by
numerous courts that the maxim, "the king can do no wrong,"
has any application to the United States, it has nevertheless
furnished the real explanation why exemption of the govern-
ment, state and federal, from liability in tort has become an
seen in the law but that are elusive to the grasp." See criticism of the
Western Maid decision in (1922) 31 YALE L.W Jothl.xAL, 879.
26See Laski, The Theory of Popular Sovcnignty (1919) 17 Micit. L.
REv. 201, reprinted in FOUNDATIONS OF SoVERIGNTY (New York, 1921) 209.
27Act of Feb. 24, 1855, 10 Stat. 612, amended March 3, 1863, 12 Stat.
765. For the debates on the 1855 Act, see 30 Congrczsional Globe, Dec.
21, 1854, at 105-114. Act of December 28, 1922, c. 17, 42 Stat. 106G; Act
of Oct. 6, 1917, 40 Stat. 389; Act of March 29, 1918, 40 Stat. 499; Act of
August 24, 1912, 37 Stat. 569, at 586; Act of Oct. 6, 1917, 40 Stat. 345,
at 364; Act of March 4, 1921, 41 Stat. 1436; Act of June 16, 1921, 42 Stat
29, at 63; Act of June 7, 1924, c. 291, 43 Stat. 477, at 433; Veterans
Act of June 7, 1924, 43 Stat. 607; Act of May 23, 1924, 43 Stat. 182, at
199; Act of June 7, 1924, 43 Stat. 477, at 492; Patent Infringement Act
of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 851; Merchant Marine Act of Sept. 7, 1916, c.
458, 39 Stat. 742; Act of March 9, 1920, 41 Stat. 525; Act of March 3,
1925 Public No. 546, 68th Cong.; Act of March 21, 1918, 40 Stat. 451.
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apparent axiom of American law. It has already been shown"
that even when the state legislature has by statute permitted
suits against the state in its courts and even where it has ad-
mitted its responsibility for "legal" claims, this admission has
been construed to exclude responsibility in tort-either on his-
torical grounds, on grounds of public policy, a "policy imposed
by necessity," or on the more juristic ground that the doctrine
of respondeat superior does not apply to the relation between
the State and its employee or officer.29
When Congress established the Court of Claims in 1855, it
omitted from the jurisdiction conferred upon that court all ref-
erence to tort claims.30  In the Tucker Act of 188731 claims
"sounding in tort" were expressly excluded from the juris-
diction of the Court of Claims. In Gibbons v. United States,
Justice Miller for the Supreme Court was so impressed with the
sacredness of the immunity in tort, that he boldly, though quite
erroneously, asserted: "No Government has ever held itself
liable to individuals for the misfeasance, laches, or unauthor-
ized exercise of power by its officers and agents." 32
Mention has already been made of the construction of the
Acts conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Claims in "implied
contract," by which that term, with minor exceptions,3 3 has been
most narrowly construed, with a consequent enlargement of
the conception of "tort." 34 In the case of Langford v. United
States,35 where government officers had taken control of plain-
tiff's land for public purposes, the government denying the
plaintiff's title, the Supreme Court deemed itself without juris-
diction on the ground of tort, though if the government had ad-
2834 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 9.
29Ibid. 11 et seq. and Clodfelter v. State, 86 N. C. 51 (1882); Lewis
v. State, 96 N. Y. 71 (1884); Gibbons v. United States, supra note 45, at
274; Langford v. United States, supra note 45; STORY, AGENCY (9th ed.
1882) § 319. But see Mills v. Stewart, 247 Pac. 332 (Mont. 1926). Yct
with respect to officers of municipal corporations engaged in corporate
functions, there is no hesitation to admit that they are agents of the com-
munity. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1924) 34 YALE LAw
JOURNAL, 129, at 133.
30 Act of Feb. 24, 1855, 10 Stat. 612, as amended March 3, 1863, 12 Stat.
765.
31 Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 505.
32 Gibbons v. United States, sitpra note 45, at 274. Attorney General
Sargent appears to have been equally badly advised as to the practice
of foreign governments when he wrote, in answer to a committee inquiry:
"This principle (immunity in tort) is fundamental in the system of any
government or sovereignty." Cong. Rec. March 16, 1926, p. 5488. The
principle of governmental responsibility has been adopted in the German
Constitution of 1919, article 131.
3 Johnson's Case, 4 Ct. Cl. 248 (1868); McKeever's Case, 14 Ct. Cl. 396
(1878).
3434 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 30.
3r Supra note 45.
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mitted the plaintiff's title, an implied contract to pay compen-
sation would have been apparent.2 In the Langford case, Jus-
tice Miller denied the propriety of the English maxim, though
he seems to have applied it to the federal government. He said:
"We do not understand that in reference to the Government of
the United States, or of the several states, or of any of their
officers, the English maxim has any existence in this country."
lie observed naively, that "we have no King to whom it could be
applied ;" that the President bears a nearer resemblance to the
limited monarch, and is the only individ.tal to whom it could pos-
sibly have any relation, and that it cannot apply to him because
the Constitution admits that he may do wrong. He adds that
the English maxim does not declare that the goecrnzmcat, or
those who administer it, may not do wrong, and then says, that
in the Langford case, "the Government or the officers who seize
such property, are guilty of a tort, if it be in fact private prop-
erty." As Justice Miller thus admits that the government,
through its agents, can commit a "tort," a legal conclusion
denied on Austinian grounds by Mr. Justice Holmes, his refusal
to admit the Court's jurisdiction is placed entirely on the statu-
tory ground exempting the government from suit in tort, and
not on the common law ground of substantive immunity of the
sovereign.37 The reason for the refusal to admit tort respon-
sibility, he explained "on a policy imposed by necessity," which
he evidently believed "applicable to all Governments." In the
case of United States z7. Lee:s in which federal officers took pos-
session of private property under a disputed title, the title was
examined and the property restored on a subterfuge that the
real parties to the case were the mistaken officers and not the
government. Had Langford sued for the recovery of his prop-
erty instead of for a money indemnity, possibly a similar sub-
terfuge might have been devised to help him.
It thus seems that the English maxim is so thoroughly en-
trenched in the common law which was taken over by the United
States, that notwithstanding our admitted difference from the
political organization and theory of government which gave it
birth, it is nevertheless adopted in the United States in its pris-
tine vigor either with new explanations or without any further
justification than the antiquity of the legal result.
36 United States v. Great Falls AMfg. Co., 112 U. S. 645, 5 Sup. Ct. '10G
(1884).
7 ,. . the very essence of a tort is that it is an unlawful act, done in
violation of the legal rights of some one. For such acts, however high
the position of the officer or agent of the government who did or com-
manded them, Congress did not intend to subject the government to the
results of a suit. . . ." Langford v. United States, s-upra, note 45, at
345.
3s 106 U. S. 196, 1 Sup. Ct. 240 (1882).
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